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Preamble 
This report is the result of work package (WP) 2 of CapHaz-Net which fulfils a specific function in 
the logic of the project: The central concepts of WP 1 and 2 – social capacity building and risk 
governance – were prior to the project identified as the major framework concepts of CapHaz-
Net. They directly relate to the other thematic work packages (on risk perception, social vulnera-
bility, risk communication, risk education and social resilience; see the figure below). Therefore 
both reports are so-called ‗living documents‘. That means that they will be further enriched over 
the project by state-of-the-art knowledge, examples of ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ practices in the field of 
natural hazard mitigation and adaptation, and by empirical examples and hazard-specific dis-
cussions.  
 











This version of the report (no. 3) is based on a preliminary draft which was presented at a work-
shop at Lancaster University on November 11, 2009 to a wider audience of 40 participants. At 
the Lancaster Workshop we used the unique opportunity to discuss the ideas presented in the 
report with a number of experts in this field and to further improve the content and the structure 
of the WP 2 report. This report has taken on board many of the suggestions and comments we 
received during and after the workshop. We want to use the opportunity again to express our 
gratitude to all the participants.  
 
Contact persons for WP2 
 
Gordon Walker (g.p.walker@lancaster.ac.uk) 
Rebecca Whittle (formerly Sims) (r.whittle@lancaster.ac.uk) 
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1 Introduction 
This report examines risk governance and how this might be understood in the context of natural 
hazards in the European Union. The report is a key deliverable from Work Package 2 of the Ca-
pHaz-Net FP7 ‗coordination action‘. The objective of the report is to review the existing literature 
on governance and risk governance and to examine how these concepts and approaches have 
been or could be applied to natural hazards.  
In addition to a review of the ‗state of the art‘, drawing from both academic and practitioner 
literatures, three brief empirical examples of past disaster events are included, each drawing on 
previous research undertaken by the research team. The empirical examples are of the:  
 
→ Hull Urban and Pluvial Flood of 2007 in the UK;  
→ Vereinigte Mulde River Flood of 2002 and Flood Protection in Germany;  
→ Barcelona Drought of 2008 in Spain  
 
These empirical examples provide a way of ‗bringing to life‘ the real world practices of gover-
nance and revealing some of the challenges, dilemmas, critiques and better and worse practices 
that are involved. Following the empirical examples the report looks ahead to consider some 
future challenges posed to the governance of natural hazards. 
At various points in this document questions are highlighted in shaded boxes. These are in-
tended to stimulate thinking about how governance and risk governance issues relate to other 
project work packages (WPs) on capacity building, vulnerability, perception, communication and 
education.  
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2 Rationale 
There are two interconnected rationales for considering the relevance and application of gover-
nance and risk governance ideas to natural hazards (see Figure 1): 
 
→ Societal change: wider changes in society and in ways of conceiving, organising and 
structuring the coordination of societal objectives inevitably shape the manner in which 
natural hazards are dealt with. As described in section 3, a broad shift has been taking 
place in how societies are governed and this is as relevant to the handling of natural ha-
zards as it is to other societal concerns such as crime, housing, economic regeneration or 
transport. The nature of the shift is unclear and contrasting accounts and explanations 
have been offered. However, section 3 outlines some characteristics of this transition – for 
example, a ‗rolling-back‘ of the state, increased privatization and the entry of new forms of 
actors (private companies, partnerships, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) etc.) 
into the political decision-making process. We therefore need to understand the nature of 
these changes and how they impact on established ways of carrying out risk or hazard 
‗management‘ in its various forms. 
 
→ Risk challenges: risk or threats to safety, health and well being and our understanding of 
these are changing. For example because of climate change and through our experience 
of new disaster events e.g. the Asian Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, European heat waves 
and droughts, or UK summer floods. The challenges these risks pose are shifting because 
of evolving patterns of vulnerability and the demonstrated limitations of existing approach-
es to mitigating or reducing risks. Furthermore, understanding of risk itself appears to be 
changing with greater appreciation of the limitations of science and predictive models and 
acknowledgement of the intrinsic uncertainties of knowledge. Risks are perceived to be 
more uncertain than previously thought and modern society appears to be increasingly in-
tolerant towards the impacts of hazards and our apparent inability to cope with risks of var-
ious forms. This means that established models and ways of thinking and acting over natu-
ral hazards may not be ‗fit for purpose‘, and that better frameworks are needed. Moving 
from established approaches of risk mitigation, risk prevention or risk management to-
wards ideas of ‗risk governance‘ is one shift in which answers to the challenges of contem-
porary and future risks may potentially be found. 
 











Changes in  
society e.g. 
new forms of  
governance 
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The first rationale leaves open the question of whether or not changes in wider society are hav-
ing positive impacts on the handling of natural hazards. Indeed there may be problematic out-
comes involved and therefore critiques of various forms to be considered.  
The second rationale has a more intrinsically positive or normative orientation, as the 
demand is for better ways of handling risk challenges. A shift towards ‗risk governance‘ may in 
this light be presented as a necessary and positive move (although agreement on this is unlikely 
to be absolute). These differences in orientation and the debates that are associated with them 
will be evident in the review and discussion that follows. 
Clearly, both rationales point to important questions that are, themselves, very much 
open to discussion and debate. This ‗living document‘ does not attempt to provide concrete an-
swers to these questions – nor specific definitions of governance. Instead, it seeks to explore the 
issues in more detail. This report will therefore be revised and updated as the discussion devel-
ops throughout the lifetime of the CapHaz-Net project. 
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3 Governance 
In order to discuss the more specific field of risk governance it is first necessary to explain what 
we mean by governance and explore some of the changes that we began to discuss in section 2 
which relate to the different ways in which societies have been governed in recent years.  
3.1  Exploring Governance1 
Governance is a complex concept that is subject to varying definitions. This report does not aim 
to offer a single, catch-all definition of the term. However, it is useful to reflect on the kinds of 
ideas that are encompassed within our understanding of the concept. Throughout this document 
we conceive of governance as encompassing a number of formal and informal arrangements 
and procedures, which change over time. These changes can also have the effect of redefining 
the relationships between government institutions and civil society. In short: 
 
“Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common af-
fairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative 
action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal 
arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.” (Commission on 
Global Governance 1995) 
  
For the majority of theorists, an important change in governance practices took place in many 
countries during the 1980s and 1990s (Bevir, 2003; Rhodes, 1997). These changes are de-
scribed in different ways. However, there are certain common core elements to this ‗new gover-
nance‘ that can be identified:  
 
Multiple actors, networks and partnerships. A key characteristic is that the new ways of go-
verning involve a diverse yet interdependent set of actors organized as part of a network. For 
example, Rhodes (1997) describes a situation where: 
 
 ―there is no longer a single sovereign authority. In its place there is: the multiplicity of actors specific to each policy 
area; interdependence among these social-political-administrative actors: shared goals; blurred boundaries between 
public, private and voluntary sectors; and multiplying and new forms of action, intervention and control. Governance is 
the result of interactive social-political forms of governing‖ (p.51).  
 
Of course, this has implications for governments. As Bevir and Trentmann (2007) highlight, one 
of the defining features of the new governance is the fact that the state is perceived to be in-
creasingly dependent on other actors ―to secure its intentions, to deliver its policies, and to es-
tablish a pattern of rule‖ (p.2). Consequently, it takes on a new role which is less about service 
delivery and more about making policy decisions. Such a change reflects Osborne and Gaeb-
ler‘s famous distinction between the ‗rowing‘ (service delivery) and ‗steering‘ (decision-making) 
functions of government (Osborne, 1992). As such, notions of partnership need to be ap-
proached critically, as the term may be used to represent a variety of very different state-society 




 We are grateful for Bruna De Marchi‘s assistance with this section. 
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New forms of authority and control. This increased emphasis on ‗steering‘ necessitates new 
forms of control based more upon diplomacy and management, as opposed to more traditional 
techniques of coercion and enforcement. For Rosenau (2004) the new governance is still about 
the exercise of authority, but crucially while states once relied on laws and regulations, they now 
employ a broader range of strategies including shaping people‘s shared norms and habits, in-
formal agreements, negotiations, etc.  
 
Multi-level governance and issues of scale. Theorists often speak of ‗multi-level governance‘ 
and the ‗hollowing out of the state‘, which refers to ―the loss of functions upwards to the Euro-
pean Union, downwards to special-purpose bodies and outwards to agencies‖ (Rhodes, 1997). 
In the past, the different tiers of government – from the local to the national and international – 
were seen as fitting neatly inside one another like Russian dolls (Hajer, 2005). Today, however, 
this linear chain of command has given way to a more complex structure based on networks, as 
subnational organizations such as local government and the voluntary sector can communicate 
directly with supranational organizations such as the European Union, and vice versa. For 
Rhodes therefore:  
 
“central-local relations are a „game‟ in which both central and local participants manoeuvre for advantage. Each de-
ploys its resources, whether constitutional-legal, organizational, financial, political or informational, to maximize influ-
ence over outcomes while trying to avoid becoming dependent on the other „players‟. It is a complex game, in which 
the various levels of government are interdependent” (Rhodes, 1997 p.9).  
 
As Rosenau (2004) argues, such changes do not mean that nation states have no role to play, 
merely that they are no longer the main players in the system. This may represent more of a 
departure for some countries than for others – in the UK, where the national government has 
traditionally been strong and regional government very weak (Rhodes, 1996), the movement of 
power outwards and upwards is readily visible. However, for countries like Germany, Switzerland 
and Italy, where the regional and local levels of government respectively have been very impor-
tant, the shift to new governance practices may not appear as immediately apparent or distinct. 
In Eastern and Central Europe the fundamental transition from very strongly state-centric com-
munist government, to various forms of democracy have represented a major shift in the locus of 
power and practice of government, but even so traditions of centralized, hierarchical, state-led 
government can still be in place. 
 
As a result of such diversity, scholarly opinion is divided over how ―new‖ these features of the 
new governance really are and how much it is possible to talk of a widespread cross-national 
shift or trend. For example, Bevir and Trentmann (2007) argue that networks and non-state ac-
tors have always had a role in policy processes, even if their roles were perhaps less explicit in 
the past.  
 
The discussion in this section has highlighted a change to the ways in which the state and civil 
society operates – all of which are relevant to the ways in which risks are understood and ma-
naged. However, there are variations to the extent of these changes throughout Europe and 
therefore it remains important to be sensitive to the contextualization of governance in time and 
place.  
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3.2  Why the new governance? 
A number of reasons are given for the emergence (in some places at least) of new processes of 
governance with the key characteristics outlined above (Bevir and Trentmann 2007). These in-
clude:  
 
→ an increase in economic activity on a global, transnational scale  
→ increased activity of supranational institutions such as the European Union, also tran-
scending national boundaries in their scope and operation.  
→ the rise of neo-liberal ideology and its tackling of what were perceived to be the inefficien-
cies of centralized state control and the overly bureaucratic public sector, replacing these 
with a market based logic of service provision through the private sector.  
→ the spread of information technology, which made it easier to link different organizations 
and introduce changes,  
→ the rise of international management fashions based upon corporate ideals (Bevir, 2003).  
 
Marks and Hooghe (2004) also point to problems such as climate change, financial crises and 
terrorism which are global in scope and which require new forms of governance as they cannot 
be dealt with by nation states working in isolation. Arguably they are also problems that cannot 
be managed only by nation state governments within national borders, their systemic complexi-
ties and wicked or messy characteristics necessitating multi-actor processes and partnerships 
organized through network rather than hierarchical relations (Watson, 2009).  
 
A further more critical hypothesis discussed at the Lancaster workshop, is that the turn to the 
new governance arises as a consequence of governments failing to address and solve some 
fundamental societal problems. The government therefore finds it useful to shift responsibility for 
solving problems onto others, whilst also maintaining control and authority over key matters of 
policy objectives, targets, resources and the like. Using the earlier analogy the government 
wants to continue to steer, but also wants more people to row in the direction they are heading. 
The extent to which this hypothesis might be relevant to hazard and risk governance will be con-
sidered in later sections.  
  
3.3  The new governance as something positive?  
A key topic of debate concerns the question of whether the forms of governance that have 
emerged can be viewed as something positive (Hajer, 2005). Those who argue in favour of the 
changes say that they amount to an increase in democracy – they claim that, as the state be-
comes less controlling and more actors become involved in the policy process, there are greater 
opportunities for the public and other previously marginalized groups to become involved in de-
cision making (Rosenau, 2004).  
In short, the new governance is said to empower people through their increased partici-
pation in the process. Furthermore, it has been argued that the inclusion of more actors in policy 
making is more capable of accounting for the existence of diversity in the ‗real‘ world as a plurali-
ty of perspectives can be incorporated into decisions (Marks, 2004). This has strong connections 
to and implications for social capacity building. 
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However, other commentators take issue with such ideas. They claim that power rela-
tions still play a vital role in policy negotiations and, consequently, the most powerful actors will 
still be able to use their leverage to ensure that the outcomes are favourable to them. In short, 
what looks like multi-level governance is actually just multi-level participation (Bache, 1999; Guy 
Peters, 2004; Bache, 2004) – more voices might be found contributing to the policy process but 
that does not mean those voices are being listened to. As such, the new governance may be a 
subtle device for maintaining established power relationships and risk exposures while giving the 
impression of openness, interaction and engagement.  
There are also major issues surrounding the accountability of the new governance 
processes. For example, the so-called ‗hollowing out of the state‘ is said to weaken institutional 
accountability as key ‗public‘ services and policy decisions which were once the preserve of the 
elected political parties are ‗farmed out‘ to the private sector or other, unelected bodies (Rhodes, 
1997). A common critique of such neo-liberal ideology is therefore that it looks to the market to 
resolve issues of accountability and justice (Bevir, 2007). As Rhodes (1997) highlights, the ‗spe-
cial purpose‘ bodies which were created by neo-liberal governments to look after particular as-
pects of service provision were not elected by the public and, as a result, it becomes hard for the 
public to influence their decisions, hold them to account for their actions or depose them if their 
actions are felt to be unfair.  
It is not just the unelected nature of these bodies which is problematic, but the fact that 
so many different organizations are involved in decision-making and service delivery, which 
makes it very hard to identify who is responsible for what. This is what Bovens (1990) de-
scribed as: ―‗the problem of many hands‘ where so many people contribute that no one contribu-
tion can be identified; and if no one person can be held accountable after the event, the no one 
needs to behave responsibly beforehand‘‖ (p.115). Such a situation is particularly problematic for 
issues of risk governance, as will be discussed in subsequent sections of this report. 
Critiques of the new governance therefore revolve around the trade-offs that exist be-
tween efficiency and accountability, as well as participation and control (Bache, 2004). As Guy 
Peters and Pierre (2004) point out: ―The argument is that the capacity to govern has been sold, 




To what extent can shifts towards the new governance be seen across Europe, and what varia-
tion is there? Have some EU member states seen stronger and more significant processes of 
change than others?  
 
How might wider patterns of ‗rolling back‘ and ‗hollowing out‘ of the state, privatization, devolving 
and sharing of power have positive or negative implications for processes producing vulnerability 
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4 Risk Governance 
Having reviewed a breadth of perspectives on governance in general, we can then see how the 
body of work on risk governance that has emerged over the past decade, engages with particu-
lar aspects of this broader literature and particular meanings of governance as a concept. The 
literature on risk governance (broadly defined) is voluminous and we do not propose to cover it 
all here. For the purposes of the present discussion we have chosen to focus particularly on two 
of the best-known examples from the field: chiefly, Renn‘s model of risk governance and Beck‘s 
writings on ‗risk society‘. The discussion is therefore designed to provide an introduction to some 
of the main issues for discussion, rather than an all-encompassing review of the field. It is also 
important to remember that, as this is a living document, this discussion will be enriched during 
the lifetime of the project in order to take account of new and interesting developments that are 
taking place within the field.  
4.1  The meaning of risk governance 
Writing from a research perspective, Renn argues that risk governance is a wide-ranging and 
inherently multidisciplinary activity that:  
 
“requires consideration of the legal, institutional, social and economic contexts in which a risk is evaluated, and in-
volvement of the actors and stakeholders who represent them. Risk governance looks at the complex web of actors, 
rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk information is collected, analysed 
and communicated, and how management decisions are taken.” (Renn, 2008 p.9) 
 
In this definition we can clearly see links with wider notions of the new governance – the in-
volvement of multiple actors and stakeholders; the range of ways in which knowledge is pro-
duced and authority is exercised; and the importance of situating governance in a multidimen-
sional societal context. Whilst we can think about risk governance in this way as a description of 
what is relevant to understanding how risk governance operates, there are also more prescrip-
tive definitions. For the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC), risk governance is de-
fined as:  
 
“the application of the principles of good governance to the identification, assessment, management and communica-
tion of risk” (IRGC (International Risk Governance Council), 2009).  
 
In this interpretation risk governance is seen as having a set of definable good qualities which 
provide for the effective integration of the key components of how problematic risks are handled 
by policy institutions (see later discussion). It is therefore used as something to be advocated, 
sought after and applied – a normative rather than only a descriptive or analytical term. In what 
follows we particularly focus on the Renn and IRGC formulations of risk governance, but bring in 
other conceptualizations of the governance challenges related to natural hazards as the discus-
sion progresses. 
4.2  Why the turn to risk governance? 
According to Renn (2008), interest in risk governance has undergone a dramatic increase in 
recent years across a variety of disciplines, where it can be applied to anything from the work-
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ings of the global stock markets to the provision of medical treatments and the introduction of 
new genetic technologies.  
  The high level of interest in the subject is reflected in the formation of the International 
Risk Governance Council in 2003. The IRGC‘s aim is to ―facilitate a better understanding of risks 
and their scientific, political, social and economic contexts and of how to manage them‖ (Interna-
tional Risk Governance Council, 2009). At the core of its approach is the recognition that many 
risks currently facing the world are complex and uncertain and that improvements in risk gover-
nance are necessary if we are to make sound decisions about these risks and bolster public 
confidence in our capacity to respond effectively towards them. Here the second of the two ra-
tionales for focusing on risk governance identified earlier (section 2), can clearly be seen at 
work.  
There are strong connections here not just to the changing nature of the risks that are be-
ing faced, but also to the ways that these risks and societal responses to them are understood. 
Perhaps the most influential account of this can be found in Beck‘s 1992 work, ‗The Risk Socie-
ty‘. At the heart of Beck‘s thesis is the notion that the unintended consequences of moderniza-
tion have resulted in new forms of risk that pose a challenge to pre-existing social and political 
processes (Bulkeley, 2001). Beck argues that these contemporary risks have three distinguish-
ing features: 
1. They are not the result of poverty or underdevelopment but instead result from many of 
the modernizing processes that have yielded benefits in other areas.  
2. They are distanciated over space and time but affect all people and all places.  
3. They cannot be sensed directly and thus rely on scientific knowledge to detect them. 
(Beck, 1992) 
Climate change could be viewed as an example of such a risk as it came into being as an unin-
tended consequence of the fossil fuel consumption that is behind much of the world‘s economic 
development. It is also global in scope and is heavily reliant on scientific knowledge to identify 
and monitor its existence and development. According to Beck, the response to such risks is a 
process known as ‗reflexive modernization‘ ―where modernization finds itself ever more occupied 
with the mastering of problems arising from the process of modernization itself‖ (Beck, 1992 
p.34). The inability of existing political structures to be able to deal with these risks has major 
implications for governance processes as the public loses confidence in the decision-making 
process and the ability of the political system to yield acceptable solutions.  
More recently – and with concepts of governance and globalization in mind – Beck has 
extended his ideas through discussion of what he calls the ‗global risk society‘ (Beck, 2006). This 
is characterized by the features described in Box 2. In short, therefore, Beck‘s ideas suggest that 
new kinds of risks pose a challenge to existing governance processes, resulting in the develop-
ment of new kinds of political processes which attempt to deal with these risks. For science and 
practices of knowledge production the challenges have been particularly significant, with much 
debate about how to deal with public unease about science and enhance democratic involve-
ment (Expert Working Group on Science and Governance 2007). 
 
Box 2: Governing the global risk society: key features of contemporary risk politics 
 
 Global risks that shatter national and political boundaries by showing that all parts of the 
globe are interlinked and dependent upon each other. 
 The production of uncertainty, or what Beck refers to as ―unknown unknowns‖ which can-
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not be contained at the level of the nation state. 
 The increased importance of risk perception as our reliance upon science and technology 
becomes destabilized: ―More important than all the ingenious probability scenarios of the 
experts becomes the question of who believes there to be a risk, and why‖ (p.42). 
 Increasing doubt or lack of confidence in society‘s ability to respond and cope effectively 
with low-certainty risks 
 New lines of conflict around risk perception. For example, Europeans accuse Americans 
of becoming obsessed with the risks from terrorism, while Americans accuse Europeans 
of being unduly concerned about ecological threats. 
 
Crucially from a governance perspective, the global risk society also involves: 
 
 The failure of national and international rule systems to control and manage risks. 
 A new global politics of uncertainty where there is increased pressure on governments to 
‗take action‘ over risks ―regardless of whether the measures taken do in fact minimize the 
risk, increase it or have no effect at all‖ (p.43). 
 A culmination of the preceding factors which results in what Beck refers to as a new poli-
tics of risk construction and risk minimization.  
Adapted from Beck (2006) 
4.3  A framework for risk governance  
Renn‘s 2008 book ‗Risk Governance‘ presents a comprehensive framework for understanding 
the topic. The book shows that there are different models for conceptualizing the way that risks 
are handled, from a simple and linear ‗technocractic‘ model, where ―objective science is seen to 
directly inform policy-making‖ (p.11) through to the ‗transparent (inclusive) risk governance‘ 
model advocated by Renn, ―in which science, politics, economic actors and representatives of 
civil society are invited to play a role in both assessment and management‖ (p.11). 
Renn‘s risk governance framework involves four consecutive phases of pre-assessment, 
appraisal, characterization/evaluation and management. It is particularly significant that a further 
fifth element - risk communication - is at the centre of the model, being important at all phases 
and providing for flows of information and dialogue between them. The key point about this 
model is that, unlike many previous attempts to characterize the risk management process, it is 
not linear but ―open, cyclical, iterative and interlinked‖ (p.47), as shown in the following diagram: 
 
Figure 2 – The five elements of risk governance (taken from Renn, 2008, p.48) 
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Hence the cycle of risk governance is presented as iterative – risk is never fully controlled or 
eradicated, as understanding of both the risk itself and the activities within each phase is con-
stantly evolving. 
The horizontal component of Renn‘s diagram – involving risk appraisal and risk man-
agement – captures what he describes as ―the two major challenges of risk governance: gene-
rating and collecting knowledge about the risk, and making decisions about how to mitigate, con-
trol or otherwise manage it‖. However, the vertical elements of the diagram – risk pre-
assessment and risk characterization/evaluation – indicate the closeness of the connection that 
exists between knowledge and values. For example, pre-assessment – the stage at which a risk 
is framed and defined – will inevitably involve social values, in the form of the determination of 
what risks are socially significant, the setting of goals, objectives and contextual conditions, as 
well as our existing knowledge about the hazard (Renn, 2008).  
Renn is also clear that, when thinking about how risk governance might actually operate 
in practice it is vital to be aware of the wider social and political context in which decisions are 
being made. Figure 3 shows how a host of factors – from organizational capacity to political and 
regulatory culture – can have a big impact on how risk governance will operate in a particular 
setting; linking risk governance to the broader shifts towards the new governance. For Renn, 
therefore, risk governance is not ―something that can be applied in a standard way in all loca-
tions, political cultures, organizations and risk situations‖. Instead, ―the entire risk governance 
process must be open to adaptation in order to reflect the specific context of each risk‖ (Renn, 
2008 p.353). This is an important point to bear in mind in considering how the framework might 
be applied to different forms of natural hazard. 
 
Figure 3: Placing risk governance in the wider social and political context (taken from Renn, 2008, p.354) 
 
 
The need to account for the specificities of different risks as well as the social, institutional and 
political contexts in which they are located can prove a particular challenge for attempts to suc-
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cessfully manage risks at the national or supranational scale as it means that blanket protocols 
which are insensitive to variations in national or local cultures are likely to be ineffective. 
Looking across the wider literature that has used and applied risk governance ideas it is 
evident that this is dominated by studies discussing technological hazards, such as those posed 
by nuclear power or GM crops. By contrast, more ‗natural‘ hazards2, such as floods, droughts or 
alpine risks, are poorly covered by the risk governance literature. A key aspect of Beck‘s (1992) 
risk society theory argues that contemporary society is dominated by new kinds of risks that are 
the by-products of technological modernization and which depend upon science to detect them. 
However, such an account offers only a partial description of the risks facing us today. Firstly, 
many of the risks experienced in contemporary society are not new – natural hazards have 
troubled society for a very long time and, just because there are now additional problems of 
technological hazards to attend to does not mean that the earlier problem of the risks posed by 
natural hazards have been resolved. Also with climate change ‗natural‘ hazards are increasingly 
taking on an explicitly social dimension3. Equally, while modernization and development bring 
hazards of their own, millions of people throughout the world remain affected by risks – both 
natural and technological – resulting from the ‗older‘ problems of poverty and underdevelopment. 
Finally, as Bulkeley (2001) points out, many contemporary hazards are anything but invisible – in 
particular, natural hazards such as floods can remain very perceptible to the senses (although 
groundwater and ‗secondary‘ flooding are more hidden; see Hull empirical example in section 
6.2). 
Therefore although we can learn much from the literature on technological hazards, it is 
also important to consider the ways in which natural hazards may require a somewhat different 
treatment. Alternatively, it might suggest as many would now argue that the traditional distinction 
between the technological and the natural is breaking down – that contemporary risks should be 
understood as the interplay between the two. 
 
Question 
To what extent is ‗social capacity building‘ (as examined in WP1) a necessary part of realizing 
‗good‘ risk governance? If wider stakeholder participation is required for risk governance what 
does this imply for social capacities and what limits and constraints might exist? 
 
To what extent do differences between forms of risk necessitate different forms of governance 
process? Can models applied largely to technological risks be translated to natural hazards? Are 
there important differences between types of natural hazard – e.g. floods, alpine hazards, 
droughts and heatwaves – in terms of their type of onset, magnitude, frequency, periodicity, spa-




 see the WP1 report for an explanation of how we see ‗natural‘ hazards as socially produced, rather than independent of human society and processes 
3
 See the WP1 report for discussion of the problematic distinction between ‗natural‘ and technological hazards and how this is resolved within CapHaz-
Net 
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5 Governance and natural hazards 
In now applying ideas of governance and risk governance to natural hazards we can as a first 
step consider to what extent the broader changes involved in the shift towards new forms of go-
vernance have been observed and commented on in the natural hazards literature.  
5.1  Multiple actors, networks and partnerships 
The management of natural hazards has always involved the activities of multiple actors beyond 
the public sector. This is particularly obvious in emergency and disaster response activities 
where coordination between multiple public services, voluntary and community organizations is 
typically involved. In most of Europe the private insurance industry has similarly always been a 
key part of the management of disaster risk (through risk transfer), but notably with quite differ-
ent arrangements between the state and the insurance industry arrived at across EU member 
states (OECD 2002, 2009).  
 However the hazards literature has noted the shift towards a greater diversity of actors be-
ing involved and the development of new roles and stronger forms of collaboration and partner-
ship working. For example Christoplos et al. (2001) identify the shifting roles for various actors 
commenting that ‗there are no longer set piece roles for states, NGOs, the private sector and 
local institutions in dealing with disasters‘ (pg 189). They also comment that ‗institutional plural-
ism and public-private partnerships are key‘ (pg 188) echoing calls across various organizations 
for more inclusion and better collaboration between actors. As a specific example in the UK the 
development of local and regional ‗resilience forums‘ has actively included such a diversity of 
public, private, and non-governmental actors. Medd and Marvin (2005) interpret this as a shift to 
a ‗governance of preparedness‘ in which key players are brought together into ‗new configura-
tions‘ of institutional actors.  
5.2  Multi-level governance  
For natural hazards the relationships between levels of governance have also become increa-
singly important. This can be seen in for example the international scale joint frameworks and 
cooperation strategies – e.g. the Global Disaster Information Network, the EU-Mediterranean 
Disaster Information Network. The Hyogo framework (2005) identifies ‗good governance‘ and 
‗international and regional cooperation‘ as particularly important to support actions at local levels, 
with major disasters seen as often beyond the capacities of nation states to manage on their 
own. The EU has become more directly involved in the governance of natural hazards, through, 
for example, setting down pan-European provisions in the Water Framework Directive and 
Floods Directive and establishing cooperation and funding mechanisms for large scale emer-
gency responses. New ways of working between local, regional and national actors have also 
been focused on in the literature. For example May et al. (1996) draw on empirical examples in 
New Zealand and Australia to analyse the significance of what they call ‗intergovernmental ap-
proaches‘ to hazards that involve moving from coercive to cooperative approaches between na-
tional, regional and local actors.  
5.3  Shifts of responsibility away from the state 
Shifts of responsibility have been associated to some degree with a shift from a stance based 
upon mitigation to one focused upon resilience and adaptation, where flood management is a 
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good case (Rogers-Wright, 2009). Here, recent years have seen signs of a shift from an ap-
proach based upon flood prevention via structural approaches and the provision of large-scale 
flood defences to an emphasis on resilience and adaptation where the goal is to help people live 
with the impacts of floods. For example, within the UK, such approaches are enshrined in the 
government‘s strategy ‗Making Space for Water‘ (Defra, 2005), as well as in recent policy initia-
tives which attempt to encourage householders and businesses to make changes to the fabric of 
their buildings in order to make them more resistant and/or resilient to floodwaters (Defra, 2008). 
This has been seen as evidence of a split between the rowing and steering elements of gover-
nance – with government continuing to set flood policy but at the same time seeking to shift re-
sponsibility for costs and actions to other segments of society (Watson et al. 2009).  
Similar changes are also taking place across Europe in relation to the problem of water 
scarcity. Structural solutions such as the construction of new reservoirs and desalination plants 
have been and are still being used to try and make more water available to more households, 
particularly at times of water stress. However, contemporary approaches are increasingly em-
phasizing the role of learning to live with water scarcity via demand management and the adop-
tion of drought-sensitive farming methods (Chappells, 2007; Ali Memon, 2006). In these ways 
those at risk – householders, businesses, farms, infrastructure managers etc. – are becoming 
managers of that risk and part of the multi-scale risk governance network.  
5.4  Diversity in governance and hazards across Europe 
Whilst such examples of the emergence of new forms of governance can be found, we need to 
guard against over-generalisation. As noted earlier the extent and significance of these changes 
can be quite different across the member states of the EU and counter-cases can be found in 
which the key characteristics are not evident or are manifest in quite different ways. To assist in 
thinking about some of these differences across Europe, Table 4 in Annex 1 gives some exam-
ples of the various governance arrangements applied to natural hazards within different Euro-
pean countries, while the box below gives a more detailed insight into how France deals with 
these issues. 
 
Multi-level Governance: The Example of France (by Jacques Comby and Thierry Coanus) 
Although a centralized state, the French governance approach to natural hazards is similarly 
complex to other European countries (cf. Table 4 in Annex 1). However, broadly speaking the 
preventive side of risk management is more a local responsibility, the emergency side of risk 
management is more a national responsibility, and decision processes regarding land use are 
also under national State supervision and control.  
The principal action of the National State could be defined as the following: Provide relevant 
scientific information about risk; supervise the security of major equipment (dams, etc.); provide 
alerts (weather and flood alerts) if needed; organize assistance when the crisis exceeds the ca-
pacity and/or the size of a municipality; keep the public domain in good condition; produce the 
PPRI (Plans de Prévention des Risques Inondations), and facilitate the actions of the municipali-
ties through providing funding. 
The Region is a rather new entity (b. 1972), which has only had executive powers since 1982. 
As a territory, it is supervised by a double hierarchy system. The Regional Council is elected, 
and has a President. This elected authority has no direct responsibility in flood risk management, 
but can be involved through funding (rebuilding of protection equipments such as dikes, re-
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search and studies) and prevention/information towards local populations. The other authority is 
the ‗Préfet de région‘, which has authority on National State policies at the regional level. In 
some cases, the ‗Prefet de Région‘ is also ‗Préfet de bassin‘: this means it has authority on rele-
vant policy actions on a definite catchment territory.  
The ‗Departement’ is one of the 95 main administrative divisions of France, and is a quite ‗old‘ 
territory (first established as such during the French Revolution). As a territory, it is also super-
vised by a double hierarchy system. On the one hand, the ‗Département‘ is a ‗collectivité territo-
riale‘ (elected assembly with some executive powers) with a President. On the other hand, Na-
tional State local policies are driven by the ‗Préfet‘ (the ‗Département‘ level of the State executive 
power). The ‗Préfet‘ is in charge of assistance when the crisis exceeds the capacity of the muni-
cipalities (through bodies or administrations such as fire departments, police forces, hospitals, 
which came directly under his authority in case of emergency situations, etc.). The Prefecture 
devises the DDRM (Document d‘Information sur les Risques Majeurs): information documents 
on major risks for all the municipalities of the ‗Département‘, and approves (i.e. makes legally 
applicable) the PPRI (flood risk prevention plan). 
 At the municipality level (‗Commune‘), the mayor (elected) is the security manager, but has no 
executive authority for (heavy) assistance purposes in case of emergency – only for protection 
policy. His main obligations are: to take into account the risk issues in urban planning docu-
ments, because of legal constraints such as PPRI. But even without them, he is supposed to 
manage correctly the PLU (‗Plan Local d‘Urbanisme‘, local land use plan), which is directly under 
his responsibility; to provide relevant information to the population through a DICRIM (‗document 
d‘information et de communication sur les risques majeurs‘), to keep in good condition protection 
equipments, general maintenance and warning procedures; to devise the assistance and emer-
gency system (when it does not exceed the capacity of his municipality). He has to devise a PCS 
(‗Plan Communal de Sauvegarde‘ – municipal safeguard plan), which organizes crisis manage-
ment at the municipal scale. 
The role of citizens in risk prevention and management is defined by two main legal acts: The 
law of 2002 (17th February), generally called ‗Law of proximity democracy‘ and the law of 2004 
(13th August), generally called ‗Law of civil security modernisation‘. One of the National State 
Leitmotiv is: information, education, responsibility, consultation. The citizens‘ participation is de-
fined as a ‗target‘ and an actor of risk prevention. For long, populations at risk were consulted 
through ‗enquête publique‘ procedures (public survey): for a definite period (generally 2 months), 
residents living on the territory can go to the town hall and write down comments and possible 
disagreements regarding the result of preparatory studies (mainly, technical maps and future 
regulations). These comments are summarised by a ‗commissaire-enquêteur‘ and are supposed 
to be taken into account before the final decision occurs. 
 
A further interesting comparison relates to the insurance arrangements provided within different 
countries for disaster risk. Here, we can see a long standing involvement of the private insur-
ance and re-insurance industry as an actor in the management of risk, but there has been no 
movement of governance of insurance upwards to the European level. Insurance arrangements 
and the relation between market and public measures are determined at a national level and as 
a consequence a great diversity exists across member states. For example in the UK in line with 
the ‗shift of responsibility‘ thesis, there has been an ever increasing trend towards individualiza-
tion of flood risk, segmentation of the market and differentiation between insurance premiums 
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depending on degrees of assessed risk at a particular location. However, in other parts of Eu-
rope exactly the opposite trend has been seen. For example in France compulsory cover for 
disaster risk is shared since 1982 amongst all policy holders with an identical additional percen-
tage premium paid on top of the assessed premium for fire insurance (French Disaster Reduc-
tion Platform 2007). This approach (which is similar to those in Belgium, Spain and Norway) is 
guided by a principle of solidarity and mutuality, which contrasts directly with the individualizing, 
market driven logic of the UK.  
In both cases public-private partnerships have been central – in the UK an agreement be-
tween the government and insurance companies to ensure the continued provision of flood in-
surance cover even in high risk locations (although at very high prices); in France a consensual 
setting up and ongoing monitoring of the shared risk arrangement linked to a public risk preven-
tion policy. But importantly the outcomes of these public-private partnerships remain quite diver-
gent and ideologically distinct.  
This example clearly demonstrates the need for CapHaz-Net to develop an appropriately 
differentiated and contextualized view of how governance and risk governance operates in prac-
tice across Europe.  
5.5  Issues and Critiques  
Whilst taking this point on board, where examples of the new governance can be found in the 
natural hazards field it is important to recognise the critique that this has stimulated. For exam-
ple, the disaster recovery literature has particularly highlighted the problems that can follow from 
a retreat from state responsibilities towards sharing these with other actors, particularly those in 
the private sector. Recent arguments, such as those presented by Klein (2007) and Gunewarde-
na (2008) mount a harsh critique of neo-liberal disaster reconstruction policies which, they claim, 
enable the private sector to benefit from disasters at the expense of local people. According to 
such accounts, neo-liberal policies encourage disaster response initiatives that are led by big 
corporate interests – such as rebuilding and redevelopment programs fronted by engineering 
consultancies and private developers. Such actions are said to perpetuate, rather than resolve, 
the socio-economic inequalities which led to local people becoming vulnerable to hazards in the 
first place, thus leaving communities more vulnerable to the effects of disasters in the future. 
Gunewardena argues that this shift from ‗assistance‘ to ‗investments‘ amounts to ―a predatory 
form of capitalism that triggers a secondary set of disempowering consequences for affected 
communities‖ (Gunewardena, 2008 p.4).  
Critiques have also centred on partnerships and participation. Pelling (2003) argues that 
partnerships, where local people can be involved alongside non-governmental organizations and 
state actors, are an important tool of governance, but also emphasizes that partnerships must be 
treated with caution if they are not to fall into the trap described in section 3.3 whereby the inter-
ests of the more powerful actors (including formal government) involved are allowed to dominate 
the decision-making process: 
 
“Collaboration between actors – particularly when grassroots actors are involved – can provide opportunities for learn-
ing how to access resources and build self-esteem with which to claim rights to resources for local risk reduction. But 
neither partnerships nor grassroots actors should be viewed romantically. Power lies in relationships, and when part-
nerships are built on unequal relations of power development outcomes are open to bias. This is as true for relation-
ships between local organizations and non-governmental or state actors as it is for relations between men and 
women, the young and old, or different ethnic or religious groups at the local level” (Pelling, 2003 p.90) 
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Such concerns are paralleled in work on participation figures within governance frameworks for 
hazards and related environmental management practices within Europe. For example, Peter-
sen et al. (2007) critique the ‗new environmental governance‘ of the Water Framework Directive 
arguing that this has become a way of extending state power rather than introducing a new form 
of more democratic politics into environmental decision-making.  
5.6  Summary and comparison of key themes 
The table overleaf attempts to draw together the discussion up to this point by identifying some 
of the key features of governance and then commenting on the possible positive and negative 
ways in which these may materialize in the governance of natural hazards. 
  
 
Table 1: The implications of shifts to governance for the governance of natural hazards 
 
New forms of governance 
 
Governance of Natural Hazards Potential Positive Implications Potential Negative Implications 
Networks of multiple actors 
beyond the state 
 
Government agencies, private sector utili-
ties, businesses, community groups, 
householders 
Different voices are heard; different skills, 
knowledges and capabilities are drawn on; 
better communication and coordination.  
 
Unclear accountability amongst different actors; 
illusion of involvement; tokenistic inclusion; slow 




International agreements. Cooperation 
between nations. Regional and local net-
works 
Greater flexibility, sharing of skills and 
resources. More cooperative solutions 
between levels. 
 
Unclear distribution of responsibilities; conflicts 
between scales; disaster capitalism 
Diverse forms of control 
 
Communication and persuasion; use of 
market mechanisms; regulation of private 
companies 
More effective and efficient ways of achiev-
ing policy objectives 
Reliance on market mechanisms disadvantages 





Sharing of responsibilities with private 
sector, NGOs and individuals 
Empowerment. More effective action in 
more places. Local decision making. More 
resources 
 
Unclear who is responsible. Fragmentation of 
policy making and policy implementation tasks. 
Individualising problems so that those who are 




6 Risk Governance and Natural Hazards 
As noted earlier the concept of risk governance and the normative models of good governance 
that have been put forward have tended to largely focus on forms of technological risk. But as 
De Marchi and Ravetz (1999) argue, governance issues are important for all kinds of risks – 
whether ‗natural‘ or technological in nature – and common frameworks for managing or govern-
ing multiple forms of hazard and risk have been increasingly sought after (White et al. 2001). 
How well then does the Renn risk governance framework in its general form (and recognizing 
the need for it to be contextualized in its application), fit within the concerns of and needs for 
dealing with natural hazards?  
6.1  The elements or phases of risk governance  
If we re-visit Renn‘s diagram (see p.16), we can see that all five elements of the risk governance 
framework can be readily identified in the field of natural hazards.  
 
Box 3: The elements of risk governance as applied to natural hazards  
 
 
Risk Pre-assessment – this involves the framing of a risk as a relevant problem, the identifica-
tion of its implications, the setting up of processes of early warning and monitoring and the se-
lection of scientific conventions for risk assessment. Each of these elements are part of 
processes for managing natural hazards. Although the identification of natural hazards as ‗rele-
vant problems‘ is generally long established, new forms of risk are still being identified as signifi-
cant in particular places partly because of the changing impacts of climate change e.g. heat-
waves in Northern Europe, more intense forms of flash floods, glacial outburst floods in the Alps. 
White et al. (2001) however note how scrutiny of ‗the creation of new and enlarged risks from 
natural hazards‘ is not as evident as it should be. 
 
Risk Appraisal – this has two major components: The scientific assessment of the risks of hu-
man health and the environment and the scientific assessment of societal concerns related to 
the risk as well as social and economic implications. Assessment techniques for natural hazards 
are increasingly appraising risks, although much of the assessment work focuses primarily on 
the hazard, with assessments of impacts and vulnerabilities often rather limited and ‗reduction-
ist‘. The assessment of societal concern, involving the appraisal of and collection of evidence on 
risk perceptions and the dimensions of expressed concern, is less routinised and less well es-
tablished within institutional practices.   
 
Risk Characterization/evaluation – this involves processes of delineating and justifying a 
judgement about the tolerability or acceptability of a given risk. Whilst not necessarily couched in 
the language of tolerability or acceptability, such judgments are routinely made for natural ha-
zards, for example in decisions over investment in flood defences or other hard engineering, in 
the setting of thresholds for when response plans are activated (e.g. heatwave plans), or in de-
termining the boundaries of land use planning zones limiting developments in risky areas.  
 
Risk Management – this involves the review of all options for taking action, based upon the in-
formation and knowledge generated in previous phases. Options for taking action can take many 
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forms, falling within categories such as risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer, and ‗doing 
nothing‘ and each can be evaluated according to multiple criteria such as effectiveness, efficien-
cy, sustainability, fairness and ethics. In the natural hazards field the need to choose between 
options based on a range of criteria has become more apparent, with, for example, the shift 
away from reliance on structural hard engineering options in flood management towards a 
broader portfolio of structural and non-structural measures (see below).  
 
Risk Communication – this has been a theme in the natural hazards field for a long time, al-
though usually conceived in terms of communication with the public through hazard warning 
systems, informing people on how to act and wider hazards education. Communication between 
stakeholders has also been integral to disaster response and emergency management where 
good information flows, coordination and collaboration are crucial.  
 
This brief analysis appears to suggest that in terms of the specification of component parts and 
elements, risk governance (as advocated by Renn and the IRGC) does not bring anything dis-
tinctly new to the natural hazards field. Existing models of risk management applied to natural 
hazards at first sight appear to have the same or similar component parts4. For example, in the 
model of flood risk management presented by Schanze (2007), sequential stages of risk analy-
sis, risk assessment and risk reduction are specified with the managing entity consisting of a 
‗multi-actor constellation representing several sectors (e.g. water and spatial planning authori-
ties), adjacent areas (e.g. multiple municipalities) and different levels (e.g. local regional)‘ (pg 3).  
However, some important distinctions can be made. First is the extent to which the risk go-
vernance framework recognizes the challenges of knowledge about risks, foregrounding issues 
of complexity (in particular systemic risks), uncertainty and ambiguity and advocating the design 
of strategies which explicitly recognise these knowledge challenges from the very beginning 
(IRGC 2008). Conventional approaches to risk management in contrast tend to be less explicit 
about such challenges, if not seeking to hide them from view. Second is the distinction between 
the degree to which risk governance necessarily involves multiple actors, extended actor net-
works and collaborative processes, and the more limited notions of participant involvement 
usually represented in models of risk management. Even though models of risk management 
may acknowledge the importance of stakeholder involvement and the like, government and ex-
pert bodies may still in reality be the primary if not sole actors involved in most of the core ele-
ments listed above. As a corollary this means that expert knowledge (and its scientific episte-
mology) still very much dominates, and local or lay knowledges remain peripheral and are given 
little real credence or significance. Risk governance potentially may go further towards equaliz-
ing knowledge claims and giving recognition to a greater diversity of voices. Following this line of 
argument Grieving and Glade (2008), in a rare and brief discussion of risk governance and natu-
ral hazards, focus on the greater degree of trust and ‗acceptance‘ that the risk governance 




 (note: terminology is confusing here as ‗risk management‘ is sometimes used as an overarching concept, encompassing such activities as appraisal, 
assessment and evaluation, rather than as in Renn‘s framework as a stage of action or intervention) 
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6.2  Communication, Participation and Knowledge  
In this light where the risk governance framework is most distinctive is in the centrality it gives to 
risk communication across and between all stages. The main emphasis of the framework is to 
see hazard assessment and risk management as acts of communication rather than a series of 
behavioral actions. Communication is understood to encompass many forms and purposes of 
flow of information between the different actors involved in risk governance and to include differ-
ent modes of interaction, participation and partnership rather than only flows of ‗expert to non-
expert‘ information. Such themes are becoming increasingly evident in the natural hazards field, 
but are not as central or applied to all aspects. Problems of knowledge flow and the failure of 
accumulated knowledge to then be effectively used to reduce disaster risks and losses have 
been repeatedly highlighted (White 2001) and various calls have been made for better commu-
nication practices between expert and policy actors as well as between professionals and pub-
lics (see Faulkner et al. 2007 on the development of a ‗translational‘ discourse on flood risk un-
certainty). Green et al. (2007) highlight the different perspectives of engineers, emergency plan-
ners, the public and researchers and the need for communication to be ‗defined in terms of 
communicating problem definitions and choices, rather than numbers‘ (pg 234).  
The need for more effective participatory processes has also become a more significant 
theme. For example, an influential statement of key principles of sustainable hazard mitigation 
(Mileti 1999) includes the importance of participatory processes (principle 6) and the involvement 
of more than those with scientific or technical expertise (principles 3 and 6). Schneider (2002) 
stresses the need to integrate emergency management into processes of community planning 
and development and argues for the need to see disasters as ‗community-based problems re-
quiring community based solutions‘ (p143). Pearce (2003) similarly stresses the importance of 
public participation within a framework of community planning that integrates closely with disas-
ter management. Tompkins et al. (2008) associate good governance of disasters with stakehold-
er participation in decision making, democratic access to knowledge and transparency and ac-
countability in relation to policy decisions. As noted above, there is a fundamental question 
therefore of whose knowledge counts and is given respect in governance processes and how 
different forms of knowledge claim can be brought together and be critically evaluated in a trans-
parent manner.  
 
6.3  Vulnerability, ‘Social Forces’ and Recovery  
There are also some important dimensions of handling natural hazards and of the associated 
research literature that do not appear to be captured as effectively by the risk governance 
framework. The first is the substantial work in the natural hazards field focusing on vulnerability 
and understanding the ‗social forces‘ that lead to and produce disasters (White et al. 2001). Risk 
is understood in the IRGC definition as a combination of hazard (energy, material, information) 
and hazard absorbing systems (structures, human beings), with risk proportional to the strength 
of the hazard and the vulnerability of the hazard absorbing system. The place of vulnerability is 
therefore recognised and vulnerability assessment is included as part of the ‗risk appraisal‘ stage 
of the governance framework (Birkmann 2006). Whilst important this does though tend to limit 
the notion of vulnerability to a technical element of knowledge generation. Other understandings 
of vulnerability would see it not only as something to be measured, but rather as at the founda-
tion of what creates or produces disasters (Pelling 2003). Here the focus shifts away from the 
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hazard itself towards differences between social groups in capacities to anticipate, cope, resist 
and recover from the impact of a natural hazard and the social forces and processes that pro-
duce these differences. How governance should address these goes far beyond the risk focus of 
the risk governance framework (Tomkins et al. 2008). We can though note that potentially at 
least the underlying vulnerabilities and inequalities that contribute to disasters may be better 
exposed and addressed by opening up assessment and decision making processes to include 
more voices, in particular those who are normally excluded and marginalized from expert and 
governmental processes.  
In a related way the risk governance framework is less obviously effective in encompass-
ing the governance of disaster and ensuing processes of recovery (although a recent IRGC re-
port has briefly considered the governance failures of the response to Hurricane Katrina; IRGC 
2009). This in part reflects its origins and predominant application in cases of technological risk, 
where large scale disaster events may not be applicable at all, or if they are they are much less 
familiar and recurrent. The management of natural hazards is often characterized in terms of a 
cycle of phases of ‗pre-event‘, ‗event‘ and ‗post-event‘ activity. Such a conceptualization does not 
though map readily on to the risk governance framework, which arguably is largely concerned 
with pre-event activity (although recognizing the feedback of risk experience into other ele-
ments). However the shift towards new governance processes is highly relevant to disaster 
management and recovery, and as noted, this has both critical and more positive dimensions. 
According to Gunewardena, disaster recovery involves more than just a ‗search and rescue mis-
sion‘. ―It should be grounded, rather, in an interrogation of the complex intertwinement of power, 
rights and justice with the objective of ensuring human security beyond mere survival‖ (Gune-
wardena, 2008 p.8). In short, post-disaster governance practices should address – or at the very 
least not worsen – the existing socio-economic inequalities that make people vulnerable to the 
effects of natural hazards. At the heart of their recommendations is a focus on giving power back 
to local communities and a commitment to reducing the kinds of structural inequalities that per-
petuate vulnerability – the latter a theme largely missing from accounts of risk governance that 
do not address underlying mechanisms and structures.  
Whilst such perspectives on disasters are largely focused on the developing world, the 
lessons offered – in terms of the role that governance can play in disaster mitigation and re-
sponse – can still be applied to the European context where vulnerabilities may be less imme-
diately apparent and where policy making tends to be more focused upon hazard control and 
prediction than disaster response and recovery. They also highlight the fact that the temporal 
dynamics of risk governance might not be best represented in a simple circular manner, implying 
somehow that there is a recurrent return to the first step. Representation of the progress of go-
vernance as a ‗helix‘ of continual change in which there is never a return to starting conditions 
may be more appropriate.5  
Bringing a number of these points together it is instructive to consider a well known model 
for representing the processes and dynamics of natural hazards and disasters. Figure 4 shows 
the ‗access model‘ of Wisner et al. (2004) which has at its centre dimensions of household live-
lihood, social forces, social relations and structures of domination and which emphasizes the 
iterative, circulating dynamism of multiple time phases and events. In this model a trigger event 
only becomes a disaster through social processes, which are structured by the way a society 
 
5
 We are grateful to Patrick Pigeon for these specific observations and suggestions made at and subsequent to the workshop. 
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operates politically, patterns of socioeconomic inequality, degrees of social protection and the 
marginality of household livelihoods. Future work might seek to grapple with how this powerful 
model might be productively interfaced or integrated with concepts and processes of risk gover-
nance, for example shaping the degree to which social protection operates effectively (particular-
ly for the most vulnerable social groups) and social and institutional learning is able to break out 
of the loop of continually repeating disaster experiences.  
 
Figure 4: The access model of hazards and disasters (taken from Wisner et al. 2004) 
 
Questions 
Does the Renn risk governance framework adequately encompass the key and specific activities 
involved in dealing with natural hazards? How as a general framework for all risks does it need 
further differentiation and specification? Can it productively be brought together with other 
frameworks from the natural hazards literature?  
 
For example can issues of scale – in space and time – be better captured by the risk gover-
nance framework? Can the framework be developed in its application to natural hazards to rec-
ognise the different temporal phases involved and to better incorporate the shifts in relations that 
emerge in response to an ‗event‘?  
 
Is vulnerability in particular sufficiently central to and incorporated within the risk governance 
framework in the context of natural hazards?  
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7 Empirical examples of Governance and Natural Hazards in Europe 
7.1  Introduction  
There are later stages in the CapHaz-Net project in which we will focus on the practices of go-
vernance for specific forms of hazard in regional contexts – flooding, alpine hazards, and 
drought/heatwave hazards. However it is still useful in initially examining the concepts and chal-
lenges of risk governance to link these to some specific experiences and contexts and to see 
how some of the general ideas might be revealed. In this section three empirical examples are 
presented. These empirical examples have not involved new research, but draw on the ongoing 
work of members of the research consortium. They each focus on different experiences, over 
different timescales and in relation to different hazard issues.  
The first on a specific urban pluvial flood in Hull in the UK considers a hazard for which 
expert risk assessment and management processes are poorly developed and focuses both on 
the causes of the flood, local patterns of vulnerability and the experience of recovery for local 
people. The second on the flood protection policies that emerged after the flooding of the river 
Elbe and tributaries in Germany considers an extreme example of a familiar form of river flood-
ing. How responsibilities and institutional arrangements have been assigned and the tensions 
and difficulties that there are around incorporating both structural and non-structural measures 
into flood protection are the main focus. The third considers the experience of a significant pe-
riod of drought in the Southern European city of Barcelona and how the management of this was 
positioned in relation to broader changes in water policy. 
  In each case we do not intend to provide a definitive account, but rather an analysis that 
can help to stimulate thinking and debate.   
 
7.2  Empirical example 1: The Hull Urban Pluvial Flood, UK  
In June and July 2007 a series of floods afflicted towns and cities across the UK. In what consti-
tuted one of the most costly flood episodes in the whole world that year, over 55,000 properties 
were flooded, over 100,000 people were evacuated and 13 died (Pitt, 2007). Whilst much of the 
flooding was from rivers and affected areas that had been flooded before, some took a different 
form. So-called pluvial floods happen when the infrastructure of urban areas proves unable to 
cope with intense rainfall. Hull, in the North East of England, suffered from a major flood of this 
form, with over 8,600 homes flooded in the course of a few hours on June 25th. It became 
known as the ‗forgotten city‘ because of the way media reporting focused on other places hit by 
the floods, overlooking a city in which some of the most serious consequences were felt. 
The City and the Flood 
The City of Hull in the North East of England is a port city, with strong historic traditions in fishe-
ries and shipping. The City sits at the mouth of the River Humber and is low lying with over 90% 
of its area below high tide levels. As a consequence most of the city is identified in Environment 
Agency flood maps as at risk of flooding, and there is a history of floods in the City from both the 
river and the sea. 
The June 2007 flood though involved the movement of neither sea nor river water. This 
was a ‗pluvial flood‘ in which extremely heavy rainfall fell directly onto the city – June 2007 was 
the wettest month recorded in Yorkshire since 1882 (Coulthard, 2007a; 7). Although ‗natural‘ 
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factors of already heavily surcharged and saturated soils and a water table sitting at a high point 
in its tidal-related cycle contributed, what was most significant in producing the flood was the 
poor performance of the urban drainage infrastructure. Due to the low elevation of the city the 
drainage system is fully pumped, using mechanical rather than gravitational processes to make 
water flow, and involves a complex network of pumping stations. It was this system that proved 
unable to cope with the levels of water flowing within the City. 
Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Recovery  
The accumulations of flood water affected many parts of the city in a patchwork. As the Indepen-
dent review report comments:  
 
“ …not all parts of Hull were struck with equal force. Given the nature of pluvial flooding, some wards or even roads 
within neighbourhoods were much more severely affected than others …. Even in wards that escaped widespread 
inundations, some localised flooding was severe”. (Coulthard et al. 2007b P8) 
 
Data collected in the immediate period after the flood showed that over 8,600 houses on more 
than 600 streets were flooded, affecting over 20,000 people or 8% of the population. In addition 
1,300 business and 91 schools were affected, seriously disrupting education provision in some 
cases for an extended period. Of the flooded households, 6,300 households were forced out of 
their homes to live in alternative accommodation, with over 1,400 people living in caravans for 
an extended period of time.  
Hull is a poor city, the 9th most deprived district in England, with a set of associated 
health, social and economic problems (Director of Public Health, 2005). This by itself is a signifi-
cant factor in increasing vulnerability to the impacts of flooding. For example, research by the 
Association of British Insurers (2002) found that 50% of households in the lowest income decile 
in the UK do not have contents insurance. A database collated by the City Council further re-
veals patterns of vulnerability amongst flooded households. As of 4 months after the flood, there 
were 8,439 flooded properties. Table 2 distinguishes between tenure of housing and the classifi-
cation used by the City to identify categories of vulnerability – Gold households are the most 
vulnerable comprising residents over 60 years of age, people with disabilities and single parents 
with at least one child under five. Silver all uninsured properties that are not already in the Gold 
category, and Bronze all other flooded households.  
 
Table 2: Households flooded in Hull: tenure by vulnerability category 










Gold  3741 (45%) 1161 425 1842 303 10 
Silver 852 (10%) 378 18 228 224 4 
Bronze 3756 (45%) 188 27 3252 272 17 
Total 8349 (100%) 1727 470 5322 799 31 
Source: HCC FLOSS database figures as of 13 November 2007 
 
This data shows the scale of vulnerability amongst the population of the City, with 45% of the 
households flooded falling into the most vulnerable category, defined by several of the characte-
ristics identified above as accentuating problems in coping and recovering.  
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Fig. 1 Caravans outside Flooded Homes in Hull 
 
In an intensive qualitative study carried out after the flood6 the severity, complexity and extended 
nature of these problems has been revealed (Whittle et al. 2010, Lancaster University, 2009; 
Sims et al., 2008a). For example, those people without household contents insurance had to 
meet the cost of replacing all their possessions themselves (contamination with sewage meant 
that residents were advised to throw away everything that was touched by the floodwater):  
  
“When the council told us to throw everything out which had come into contact with the water as the water was con-
taminated we were absolutely gutted – more so when the dust cart came and took it all away. As we weren‟t insured 
all we could think of was ‟Oh my god we‟ve got nothing left and it took us years to get that sort of furniture together‟” 
(Marion, diary). 
 
They also found finding alternative accommodation to live in enormously difficult, in part because 
of local estate agents pushing up rents and making profits ‗from others misfortune‘. Even for 
those people with insurance it took repeated and frustrating battles and negotiations with loss 
adjusters to settle a claim, a task much harder for those without the capacity, time, confidence or 
capability to take this on. As research on other major floods has reported (e.g. Convery and Bai-
ley, 2008; Reacher et al., 2004; Tapsell et al., 2003) the health impacts after floods can be se-
vere with existing conditions made worse, new illnesses put down living in poor conditions and 
high levels of stress produced by trauma, anxiety, disruption and the pressure on family relation-
ships. The diaries and interviews revealed many cases of severe stress and psychological im-
pacts. For example:  
 
“Some days I just felt like jumping off the Humber Bridge. It‟s been that low, it‟s been that bad, except I‟m not brave 
enough to do it. But the state of mind you‟ve been in – some days I‟ve just sat in here and just sobbed and sobbed 
and sobbed.” (Leanne, interview)  
 
Whilst older people were a specific concern for the council, with local community wardens mak-
ing particular efforts to support them during the recovery process, it proved difficult to identify all 




6 Lancaster University (2009) Flood, recovery and urban resilience: a real-time study of local recovery 
following the floods of June 2007 in Hull www.lec.lancs.ac.uk/cswm/hfp  
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Some householders who initially thought that they had escaped the flood entirely have also had 
the problem of ‗secondary flooding‘ to contend with. In many places the flood water was relative-
ly shallow and it was a matter of a few centimetres that could determine whether or not the thre-
shold of the house was breached and water flowed into front rooms and kitchens. However even 
if bad water did not visibly come over the doorstep, it could still invisibly enter the space of the 
home through flowing into voids under suspended floors, soaking joists and the underside of 
floorboards and causing damage that was subsequently remedied by means of the ‗strip out‘ – 
the same process of gutting and replacing that was used with households that experienced visi-
ble flooding above the level of the floorboards. ‗Secondary flooding‘ caused particular problems 
in Hull, not only because of the number of households affected (in November 2007, 20 new cas-
es were being discovered each week). The timing of the appearance of secondary flooding also 
caused problems, as the damage – in the form of rising damp, mould, buckling floorboards etc. – 
was often slow to appear, with people reporting damage over a year after the original flood 
event.  
Governance Issues 
This case of the Hull flood raises many governance issues, including failures of effective gover-
nance, as well as highlighting challenges to current and future practices.  
1) Privatization and Regulation  
The operation of the drainage system of the City was the responsibility of a private water com-
pany, Yorkshire Water, which took up this role when the water industry was privatised as part of a 
wider programme of ‗rolling back‘ the state in the 1980s. Investigation of the condition of the 
main pumps by the time the flood had happened found these to be in ‗poor condition and unreli-
able‘ (Coulthard et al., 2007b). One pump in the Bransholme area of the City, was overwhelmed 
by the flood water and completely failed. Other parts of the system proved to have insufficient 
capacity. Looking back at the history of the system and decisions taken, the Independent Review 
Body (IRB) found that few records could be retrieved from Yorkshire Water but what they could 
gather showed that a series of recommendations for upgrades of vulnerable or aging parts of the 
system had been ignored and the cheapest options had always been selected by a company 
with a concern for its profits profile and return to shareholders:  
 
“From the range of options presented in the 2004 and 2006 [engineering capacity] reports, it would appear that York-
shire Water have consistently taken the cheapest path available to them at the time… We feel it is deeply regrettable 
that it has taken the events of 25
th
 June 2007 for the deficiencies in East and West Hull‟s drainage system to become 
public knowledge. Had one of the permanent solutions recommended in 2004 and 2006 been implemented we believe 
the impacts of the June 2007 floods would have been less severe.” (Coulthard et al., 2007b p.39) 
 
The IRB‘s report also looked at the role played by OFWAT, the water industry regulator. The reg-
ulator has a crucial part to play within the water industry because the high levels of capital in-
vestment required to transport and supply water and sewerage prevents competitors from enter-
ing the market, with the result that each water company enjoys a monopoly in the region that it 
serves. This absence of competition can act as a disincentive to further capital investment in the 
relevant infrastructure, and therefore effective regulation is essential in order to protect the inter-
ests of the public. However, the overall conclusion of the IRB‘s report was that OFWAT‘s regula-
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tory powers were insufficient and weakly applied. In the first instance, there are no mandatory 
standards for surface water drainage and sewage capacity and, consequently, OFWAT has no 
powers to ensure that the infrastructure is designed to particular standards. Secondly, under 
current legislation it is not compulsory for the water companies to share all the relevant informa-
tion about their strategy, performance and operation to either OFWAT or the public. Therefore, 
although OFWAT requested an ‗independent‘ review of Yorkshire Water‘s performance, this re-
view was undertaken by a private consultancy which was appointed and paid for by Yorkshire 
Water. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the resulting report made no mention of the design capacity prob-
lems highlighted by the IRB (Coulthard et al., 2007b). 
2) Institutional Fragmentation and Responsibility 
Other problems with the management and functioning of the drainage system included institu-
tional fragmentation with different organisations responsible for different parts of the drainage 
infrastructure. Within Hull, the Environment Agency is responsible for all open bodies of water, 
as well as for river and tidal flood defences; Yorkshire Water is responsible for the sewers and 
Hull City Council is responsible for the roadside gullies that feed into these sewers, except 
where these fall on private land – in which case they are the responsibility of the property-owner. 
This results in a complex picture where ―No single agency… accepts responsibility for any ele-
ments outside their own terms of reference nor have they historically allowed others to influence 
their own obligations‖ (Coulthard et al., 2007a p.3). As a result:―the flooding in Hull has revealed 
the difficulties of having multiple agencies responsible for different areas of the drainage system‖ 
(ibid p.3). 
Similar conclusions were also reached at the National Level in the Pitt Review – the in-
dependent review commissioned by the government to determine the causes and consequences 
of the 2007 floods. Pitt commented that: ―responses to local flood risk are piecemeal and not 
necessarily prioritised. Each of the organisations with a responsibility for certain assets tends to 
carry out maintenance and improvement works independently, as there is currently little incentive 
to do otherwise. This results in investment decisions being made in isolation, which at best leads 
to inefficiencies and at worst actually increases the risk of flooding‖ (The Cabinet Office, 2008 
p.84). 
This fragmented nature of institutional responsibilities was a source of anger in Hull, with 
residents feeling that the relevant agencies were using the complex ownership regime as an 
excuse to evade their responsibilities and avoid taking action. Consequently, although the IRB‘s 
report concluded that blocked drains were not to blame for the flooding7, many residents drew 
upon local media reports and the evidence of their own eyes (this was particularly important for 
those who had lived in their neighbourhoods for a long time) to argue that council cutbacks on 
drain cleaning as a result of financial problems were to blame. However, these claims were 
strongly disputed by the City Council itself.  
3) Knowledge, assessment and expertise  
As the Pitt Review noted (Pitt 2007), extreme pluvial flooding is hard to predict and is not cur-
rently part of the established routines of flood risk modeling, assessment, mapping and warning. 
The flood risk map that is produced by the EA precisely delineates areas at specified levels of 
 
7
 They did concede that it may have worsened the flooding in some locations. 
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risk from sea and river flooding, but pluvial flooding is not included. Consequently some of the 
areas that were flooded in Hull in 2007 were not mapped as being ‗at flood risk‘ and many 
people were surprised when they flooded because they lived nowhere near the river. Similarly 
the EA flood warning system operates on the basis of monitored and modelled sea and river 
levels. It does not predict and therefore warn on flooding solely from pluvial events. Hence for 
the Hull flood whilst heavy rain was forecast there was no specific flood warning issued to local 
people.  
Issues of knowledge and expertise also come to the fore where ‗secondary flooding‘ and 
building restoration is concerned. In the case of ‗secondary flooding‘, no water is visible above 
the floorboards in the home and, as a result, detecting the problem and its cause requires a se-
ries of technical interventions and expert judgments by surveyors. Insurers and surveyors may 
argue that the problem is one of damp, rather than flood, thus meaning that residents are unable 
to access the kinds of support and financial assistance available to ‗flood victims‘. Equally, no 
concrete standards exist for what should be done to a flooded property in terms of the repairs 
process. The accepted practice is one of stripping back fixtures, fittings and plaster, followed by 
a period of ‗drying out‘ – however, some surveyors argue that this process causes unnecessary 
expense and disruption for the householder and that other, less drastic methods are more effec-
tive. 
 
Fig.2 A ‗stripped out‘ house 
 
 
4) Response Capacity  
Sir Michael Pitt described the floods of 2007 as ―the country‘s largest peacetime emergency 
since World War II‖ (Pitt 2007 p.vii). Responding to an event of this magnitude was a tremend-
ous challenge and, within Hull, a range of organizations were involved in dealing with the emer-
gency, including Hull City Council, Humberside Fire and Rescue Service and the police. Howev-
er, the IRB‘s report also paid testament to ―the incredible resilience and high levels of social capi-
tal shown by the residents of Hull. The good will, comradeship and willingness to help neigh-
bours and strangers in times of need are extraordinary‖ (Coulthard et al., 2007b p.61) 
However, other aspects of the emergency response phase were criticised – in particular, 
communication between the relevant agencies and the public was felt to have struggled, with 
some 360 calls to the fire service going unanswered because the telephone lines were inun-
dated (Coulthard et al., 2007a p.17). Once again, the fragmented management of the drainage 
system also caused problems for attempts to minimise the scale of the flooding as there was no 
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centralised information regarding the ownership, maintenance and management of the various 
parts of the drainage system.  
One of the biggest challenges for risk governance is how to ensure that there is enough 
spare capacity in key institutions and systems to respond to large-scale disasters. There is a 
clear tension here in that the kinds of privatizing processes described previously tend to result in 
spare capacity being taken out of the system (on the grounds that its existence is uneconomic 
on a day-to-day basis). However, this can mean that, when a disaster happens, such ‗pared-
down‘ services and infrastructure struggle to cope with the demands placed upon them. Within 
Hull, a key part of the immediate emergency response effort involved the mobilisation of some 
750 council staff who were taken from their desk jobs to ‗door knock‘ and find out which proper-
ties in the city had been affected and what the needs of their residents were (Coulthard et al., 
2007b). Hull also has a system of community wardens who work in their respective communities 
to help local residents and to tackle issues of antisocial behaviour, nuisance and vandalism. Dur-
ing the immediate response to the floods and the longer term recovery process that followed, the 
community wardens performed a wide range of essential tasks, including evacuating schools 
and residential homes, providing health and safety information and cleaning products to resi-
dents, operating emergency centres and supervising closed roads. They also played a key role 
in the council‘s door knocking campaign and collected considerable amounts of data on the 
flooded households. Although much of the work fell outside the wardens‘ usual duties, their good 
people skills and in-depth knowledge of their communities meant that, in particular areas, they 
provided a valuable source of help for residents and workers alike. The Independent Review 
Body‘s report identified the wardens‘ key strengths as being their flexibility and their local know-
ledge: 
 
“The Community Wardens proved to be an effective and flexible human resource. They were able to respond quickly 
and effectively and had the benefit of a large amount of local knowledge of the area and the residents where they 
were based. (Coulthard et al., 2007b p.18). 
 
In many respects, therefore, the community warden service represents the kind of flexible capac-
ity that can be vital in helping residents to recover from disasters such as floods. However, re-
cent City Council funding cutbacks have led to a dramatic reduction in the service, with 110 war-
dens across the city being reduced down to 38 (Goodwin Development Trust, 2009). This raises 
important questions about how the recovery effort could be resourced if the floods were to hap-
pen again.  
5) Governance of recovery  
The floods of 2007 provoked an intense debate about organizational responsibilities. The Pitt 
Review (2007) criticized what it saw as poor coordination between different agencies and, as a 
result, recent government consultation documents have attempted to clarify, firstly, which organi-
zations are responsible for which particular aspects of emergency response in the aftermath of a 
major flood (Defra, 2008) and, secondly, which roles different organizations should play in flood 
risk management (Defra, 2009). However, studies looking at the longer-term recovery process 
(as opposed to the immediate emergency response phase) show that almost no attention has 
been paid to the question of who is responsible for helping and supporting residents during the 
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months and years that follow the flood, as they go through the long and difficult process of trying 
to get their lives and homes back on track (Whittle et al. 2010).  
The study of flood recovery in Hull has revealed that residents come into contact with a 
range of different companies and organizations in the aftermath of a flood, from insurers to loss 
adjusters, builders, estate agents and the city council (Sims et al., 2008a). Indeed one resident 
had contact with 15 different agencies during the recovery process. However, it is currently up to 
the resident to negotiate his or her way through this organizational maze and this can be very 
difficult when conflicting advice is provided and when the various agencies involved do not 
communicate with each other, as one resident described: 
 
We lost the fridge and the freezer and the cooker in the kitchen but the scary thing was we were actually still using 
them – nobody condemned them or even suggested that they were contaminated in any way, shape or form until we 
moved out. And then they said, “Oh you shouldn‟t have been using them”… The thing is as well, you find out different 
things from different people. Just by talking to your neighbours – they‟d been told a completely different story to what 
you are getting told by their insurance company. (Melanie, interview) 
 
Another interviewee, who was a council tenant, said that she had been instructed to throw out 
everything that the water had touched, because it would be contaminated. However, when the 
contractors came to strip out her kitchen, they left the kitchen units in place, despite the fact that 
these had been completely under water. Such examples show how, at present, the kinds of ex-
periences that the resident has during flood recovery – and the processes that he or she goes 
through – are almost entirely dependent on which companies or agencies that person has con-
tact with. Consequently if loss adjusters or builders are obstructive or unhelpful, the resident has 
to try and resolve matters on his or her own by questioning, arguing and pushing for a different 
solution to the problem. However, more vulnerable residents who lack the skills, knowledge and 
financial resources to do this can be left in very difficult circumstances unless they have some-
one to champion their cause. In Hull, attempts were made to bridge this ‗recovery gap‘ by use of 
a number of services. Firstly, the Citizen‘s Advice Bureau helped many owner occupiers and 
private renters who had disputes with insurers, builders or landlords. Secondly, the community 
wardens worked to help and support households placed in the most vulnerable ‗gold‘ category. 
Finally, the council also launched a dedicated Flood Advice Service which residents could go to 
for advice and help around flooding issues. The diaries of FAS workers revealed the kinds of 
help and support that this service was able to provide for vulnerable residents: 
 
“Have been dealing with a lady this week that had been living in appalling conditions. Unfortunately it is certainly not a 
one-off case. She had no floorboards downstairs and her floor space was still full of water. The whole of her upstairs 
was wet to the touch and everything in it. She is registered disabled and has severe epilepsy so felt the house was 
especially unsafe for her to be in. She appeared to have been overlooked and ignored by her insurance company. 
Emily and I managed to find her alternative accommodation and push her insurance company into dealing with her 
claim as a priority. We were so pleased to have been able to help her.”  
 
However, although the FAS and community wardens did provide help and support to many 
people, vulnerable residents still slipped through the net and there were many people who 
needed help but did not receive it. The FAS was also closed one year after the event despite the 
fact that many residents were still experiencing problems with ‗secondary flooding‘. 
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There were also issues about how the recovery process was funded. After the floods, the Red 
Cross sent £720,000 to help Hull during the flood recovery. However, during a group discussion, 
flood support workers revealed how frustrated they were by the fact that all this money had to be 
spent by the first anniversary of the floods. They felt that, in order to be effective, the funding had 
to be available for a much longer timescale in order to help people with the more protracted 
problems they were facing. There is therefore a mismatch between the ways in which flood re-
covery is governed (and political imperatives which say that flood recovery must be seen to be 
finished quickly in order for the various organizations involved to be viewed as successful) and 
the much longer-term needs of residents on the ground. 
6) Building future resilience?  
Particularly in the context of climate change, policy makers and practitioners tend to highlight the 
importance of building resilience for the future. Ideally, therefore, disaster recovery should not 
just aim to return people to ‗normal‘ but, instead, return them to a state where they are more resi-
lient and not susceptible to repeat events in future. Such thinking is behind recent government 
consultations on property-level flood resistance and resilience measures, which advocate the 
installation of structural measures in people‘s homes to lessen the damage and disruption 
caused by flooding (Sims et al., 2008b). However, research in Hull indicates that very few prop-
erties have had such measures installed in them during the repairs process8. When asked about 
this, residents explained that the main barriers included the fact that insurers would not pay for 
them – this is because the terms of insurance are based upon the principle of replacing like with 
like. By contrast, property-level flood resistance and resilience measures are considered to con-
stitute an improvement to a property, and this is not allowed under insurance principles. Another 
problem concerns a lack of technical expertise and building materials necessary to install these 
measures, which could result in considerable delays to the repairs for the resident. It could 
therefore be argued that, by putting people‘s homes back to normal, people‘s vulnerability to 
future flood events has been reproduced. However, there are also other respects in which 
people may be left more vulnerable for the future. Many residents found that their homes lost 
value after the floods, or that their insurance premiums or excess payments greatly increased: 
 
“The excess has gone up £5,000 we have to pay on contents and £5,000 on buildings. So if the same thing happened 
again we‟ve £10,000 to find before we start. And where do we pluck that from? Where do we get that from? We ha-
ven‟t got £10,000. Or do we save anything at all or do we literally just let the whole lot go and say it‟s all gone and 
claim what we can and just have everything lesser?” (Leanne, group discussion) 
 
Other residents found that they could not get insurance at all. There was also a feeling that a 
repeat of the flooding would be just too much to cope with from an emotional perspective, as 
Abby described: I‟d rather just set fire to the house, walk away and just never come back I think. 
I couldn‟t do it again.” 
7) Learning lessons and reforming governance 
The sheer scale of the damage and disruption caused by the floods of 2007 has resulted in a 
number of policy initiatives designed to learn the lessons for the future. At the national level, the 
 
8
 It is more cost-effective to install property-level flood resistance and resilience measures during repairs because building work is already being carried 
out. 
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Pitt Review made 92 recommendations for improvements, covering areas as diverse as flood 
warnings, flood risk legislation, recovery guidance and the advice given to householders Pitt 
2007). Many of the issues addressed in this report were directly related to the governance of 
flood risk and recovery and, as a result, government consultation documents have been pro-
duced in an attempt to deal with Pitt‘s critiques.  
Particular areas in which change can be identified include the launch of the Draft Flood 
and Water Management Bill (Defra, 2009), which aims to unite previously disparate bodies of 
flood risk legislation in one document which, crucially, also includes reference to surface water 
flooding9. The draft bill also attempts to establish clearer lines of organizational responsibility, 
with local authorities being given a stronger role in flood risk management within their localities. 
The need for an integrated flood warnings system which covers all types of flooding (not just the 
pluvial and coastal sources covered by the current system) is also highlighted. By contrast, the 
consultation on the National Flood Emergency Framework (Defra, 2008) attempts to establish 
clarity over which organisations are responsible for what actions in the immediate aftermath of a 
flood. Finally, the consultation on property-level flood resistance and resilience measures ex-
plores possible ways of encouraging householders to get such measures installed in their 
homes. 
Of course, it is not just central government that is implicated in responding to the Pitt Re-
view – a host of organizations, including the Environment Agency and the Association of British 
Insurers have been challenged by the recommendations and are looking at how to improve their 
own institutional practices. At the local level, too, Hull City Council conducted its own lessons 
learnt exercise, although this report is not in the public domain.  
In many respects, therefore, it looks as if flood governance practices are changing. How-
ever, there are other respects in which change appears slow in coming. At the local level, one of 
the biggest questions concerns the way in which institutional lesson-learning actually takes 
place. During the floods, many Hull City Council staff were seconded from their normal roles to 
perform flood-related duties and they amassed considerable amounts of skills and experience 
while performing these roles. However, after the floods, these individuals returned to their day 
jobs and senior management staff moved on to roles in other organizations. Therefore, although 
potential improvements have been committed to paper, the power of these lessons learnt reports 
is questionable when the individuals involved are no longer in the same jobs.  
 
Summary: Governance issues were central to every aspect of the events in Hull – from the mul-
tiple stakeholders and subsequent confusions over responsibility and maintenance that were 
implicated as being partially responsible for the floods, to the ways in which the recovery was 
managed by multiple agencies with differing results for residents. More recent developments that 
have taken place in Hull, such as the downsizing of the community warden service, are also 
symptomatic of the cuts in public funding and the ‗rolling back of the state‘ that are often asso-
ciated with new forms of governance. The Hull example also illustrates how some of these new 
forms of governance – for example, the cuts to the warden service and the individualization of 
risk resulting in rising insurance premiums for residents – could have a detrimental impact on the 
ability to cope with risks in future. However, at the national level some more positive changes are 
in evidence as the Hull floods were a contributing factor in the launch of some new policies 
 
9
 Surface water flooding was omitted from previous flood risk management legislation. 
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around flood and water management issues (for example the Flood and Water Management Bill) 
which seek to counter some of the problems of these new governance processes such as the 
institutional fragmentation of drainage management issues.  
 
7.3  Empirical example 2: The Vereinigte Mulde River Flood and Flood Protection Policy, 
Germany 
While the Federal Republic of Germany had for most of its history not been affected by disastr-
ous weather extremes – apart from the storm flood in Hamburg in 1962 – a series of floods dur-
ing the 1990s and finally the 2002 summer flood along the Elbe River and its tributaries initiated 
a public and political debate on how to design flood protection efforts more effectively in the fu-
ture10. The Vereinigte Mulde case study will therefore deal primarily with the time span reaching 
from the 2002 flood to summer 2008. It demonstrates that the flood protection approach imple-
mented in 2002 was largely developed under the influence of the experiences of the 2002 flood.  
 
The German political context  
Germany is a federal and parliamentary representative democracy by constitution. Its main fea-
tures are a polycentric administrative structure and decentralized political system. The adminis-
trative structure consists of three levels of decision-making that possess constitutional autono-
my: the federal (Bund), states (Länder) and the local authorities (Gemeinden and Städte). Flood 
protection is, above all, the responsibility of the states. However, the federal level provides the 
general conditions that have to be considered by the states. The states and also the local au-
thorities are responsible for implementing the actual measures.  
As a result of the 2002 flood and the public debate in its aftermath, in May 2005 a new 
flood protection law (Hochwasserschutzgesetz) became effective in Germany, which for the first 
time provides coherent instructions for how to adapt to flood hazards. This law complements the 
Water Management Act (Wasserhaushaltsgesetz, WHG) (Köck, 2005). It has been the duty of 
the single states (Bundesländer) to put the federal law into legislation from May 2007. The state 
of Saxon acted early and passed its Water Law (Wassergesetz, WG) in September 2004.  
In the context of the discussion of risk governance, the following important regulations 
(Regelungen) within this legislation need to be highlighted: 
  
• Areas prone to floods with an exceedance probability of 1/100 are defined as ‗flood prone ar-
eas‘; the standard to define the protection goal for settlements in prone areas is also the ex-
ceedance probability of 1/100 (WHG § 31 b Abs. 2);  
• In flood prone areas the utilization of land is considerably restricted and prerequisites for ex-
ceptions to this are much more tightly defined (WHG § 31 b Abs. 4);  
• Thirdly, citizens in areas prone to flood hazards are obliged to implement mitigation measures 
in accordance with their possibilities and abilities (WHG §31 a). Almost the same phrase is to 
be found in the formulation of the new Saxon Water Law (WG § 99).  
 
There has been some critique of these regulations (Köck 2006), for example on the following 
specific points:  
 
10
 This case-study is a condensed version of two previously published reports (Schanze et al. 2008, Beck et al. 2009) 
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• the exclusive orientation on statistical return rates, which are based on past events is problem-
atic since it neglects the fact that simple projections are not sufficient to anticipate future risks. 
This point of criticism is particularly relevant, since there is no binding time frame for updating 
the flood protection plans.  
• furthermore, defining flood protection standard simply based on a statistical return rate (e.g. 
1/100) is not meaningful, since economic, ecological and social criteria are not considered.  
• whilst it is positive in principle is to require citizens to implement private adaptation measures, 
this requirement is largely not known about and regarded by some as an over-excessive de-
mand on the individual.  
Research on the Vereinigte Mulde flood  
The case study is based on research in three communities along the Mulde River, a tributary of 
the Elbe River (see Steinführer and Kuhlicke 2007 for details of methods). The area was heavily 
affected by the flood in August 2002, causing major damage in towns and villages. The existing 
flood protection system collapsed in many places during this exceptional ―flood of the century‖ 
which was defined as an event with an exceedance probability of 1/200 – 1/250 (von Kirchbach 
et al., 2002; Freistaat Sachsen, 2002; SMUL, 2003). Overall, the 2002 flood is the single most 
expensive flood in German history. The economic losses were estimated at 11.6 billion €. 
(Schwarze and Wagner, 2007). The three communities examined represent quite different ap-
proaches to flood protection, since they pursue different strategies with regard to the implemen-
tation of structural and non-structural measures. In summary: 
 
• The city of Eilenburg (18,000 inhabitants; 2003) experienced severe damages in 2002. Quickly 
after the flood the collapsed levee system surrounding the city was rebuilt and reinforced. It 
represents a community which pursues a classical structural flood protection approach relying 
mostly on dikes and walls surrounding the city.  
• The village of Erlln (93 inhabitants, 2005) also experienced severe damages in 2002. It applies 
a mixture of relocating dikes (non-structural) and improving existing dikes (structural). 
• The city of Grimma (18,000 inhabitants, 2003) also experienced severe damages in 2002. The 
city represents a community which has to rely on non-structural measures such as a locally or-
ganized warning system, since it is not yet protected by technical flood protection measures. 
Responsibilities, finance and administrative structures 
There are two different authorities responsible for flood protection in the case study area. While 
the State Reservoir Administration (LTV) is above all responsible for structural measures, the 
Saxon State Agency for Environment and Geology (LfUG) is responsible for non-structural 
measures such as warning. Between both organizations a misbalance exists with regard to their 
financial resources, a misbalance which has consequences for adaptation measures.  
To understand the current situation, it is insightful to go back to the time shortly after the 
flood. In the aftermath the decision-makers used the bitter ―lessons learnt‖ as a ―window of op-
portunity‖ to improve the flood protection along the Mulde River. After the 2002 flood the respon-
sible Saxon State Ministry of the Environment and Agriculture (SMUL) initiated the reconstruction 
and development of new flood protection and put the LTV in charge to design and implement this 
new flood protection concept (Hochwasserschutzkonzept).  
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The LTV developed after the flood a new flood protection concept, which is quite innova-
tive, at least in the German context, exceeding in one respect even the legal requirements. The 
indicative protection goal is to protect settlements against floods up to an exceedance probability 
of 1/100 by means of flood protection measures (LTV 2003). However, this protection goal is 
only valid for densely populated areas. For single buildings and temporal settlements a protec-
tion goal is designed only up to an exceedance probability of 1/25 and for agricultural areas only 
against floods with an exceedance probability up to 1/5. Hence, the flood protection concept 
takes different protection goals into account. Furthermore, each structural measure was priori-
tized according to their meaning for the communities at risk. Therefore all 1,600 measures 
planned in the 47 flood protection concepts were evaluated and prioritized (SMUL 2005). Most of 
the measures given a high priority have been already carried out or will be conducted during the 
next few years. 
Besides these flood protection concepts focusing on structural measures the SMUL in-
itiated the development of a flood warning system (the Saxon Flood Centre, see 
www.hochwasserzentrum.sachsen.de). This warning system is supervised by the Saxon State 
Agency for Environment and Geology (LfUG). 
An important characteristic of this administrative structure is the availability of considera-
ble financial resources. In the aftermath of the 2002 flood the affected communities and regions 
could rely on heavy financial support by the European Union, the Bund (federal state) and The 
Free State of Saxony. One narrator explicated that about half a billion Euros are available for 
flood protection until 2013 and stated: ―No measure dashes against money‖. And another under-
lined: ―We have so much money around that it would be really great if it needed no authorization 
process‖ 
As a consequence of the previous outlined development (1/100 protection goal for settled 
areas, the division of responsibility and funding) structural adaptation measures have been 
clearly prioritized in Saxony. To reach the standard protection goal, structural measures inevita-
bly need to be implemented. The funds, which were available for reconstruction and for which 
the Saxon Government decided to apply, that is the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), clearly favors structural measures, too. The flood protection concept was already orga-
nized in-line with the standards of ERDF. It war furthermore decided that the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment and Agriculture would receive larges amount of funding. The ministry transferred most 
of the money directly to LTV (Fig. 5) and the latter employs mostly engineers favoring structural 
measures. As a result, no integrative view was pursued on flood protection. While LTV, respon-
sible for structural measures, is financially better equipped and leads in the implementation of 
adaptation measures, LfUG, responsible for non-structural measures (e.g. warning), is not in-
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It needs to also be emphasized that during the initial phase of setting up the flood protection 
concept and defining responsibilities climate change played no role, neither in documents nor in 
discussions. This has started to change only in the last 2 years. 
The Views of Decision Makers and the Local Population 
The analysis of the view of decision-makers involved in flood risk management as well as the 
opinions of the local population reveal three dominant arguments that relate in various ways to 
governance and risk governance issues.  
 
(a) There exists a strong desire among the affected population for structural measures, 
which is connected with a demand for security. The 2002 flood meant a loss of control for 
many people and caused considerable damages – not only in an economic sense but even more 
so in an emotional sense (Steinführer and Kuhlicke, 2007). In the aftermath of the flood therefore 
a need for security developed among the population. This need is mostly associated with a spe-
cific imagination about how flood protection should be organized, which finds its expression in a 
strong belief in the superiority of structural measures. Generally, the interviewees underlined that 
the population desires a form of protection, which is visible and which appears as reliable. These 
attributes are associated with structural measures like dikes and walls.  
This need was taken into account by the decision-makers: ―The State government works 
for the citizens and not for itself, from there comes the input and from there a political opinion is 
developed”. As the overall majority of the population favored physical measures – an assumption 
that is clearly confirmed by empirical investigations – the representatives of the political system 
favored these measures too.  
This dominant view is contrasted with technical considerations by the decision-makers 
themselves. Particularly the LTV was also considering measures that had a greater nonstructural 
character (e.g. the slitting of dikes or the relocation at bottlenecks). However, in the course of 
time in many cases they adapted their plans to the dominating belief among the population 
about how such measures should be implemented.  
 
(b) Even if non-structural measures were considered in the aftermath of the 2002 flood 
they could not be realized, since there was strong resistance among the population. Re-
sistance to non-structural measures appeared in many cases. In Erlln, for instance, a ring dike 
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was planned offering protection for a 100 year flood. At the same time the old dike should be 
slated to create more retention area for the Mulde River. However, local residents did not favour 
these measures and resistance was building up. Two interests group were key. The local farmers 
feared that their fields would be prone to repeated flooding twice per year and their fields hence 
prone to an increased pollution. The local soccer association feared that if the dike would have 
been slatted the soccer field would also have been regularly flooded. Because of this resistance 
the LTV decided to rebuild the old dike according to its previous level of protection.  
Furthermore, the ring dike in Erlln could not be put into practice as it was initially intended 
by the LTC, since the new dike required changes in the land use in Erlln. The citizens affected 
did not consider compensation payments as sufficient. As a result the LTV initiated an intensive 
dialogue with the local population to convince them of the necessity that every single person has 
to contribute to the overall aim of protecting the community more effectively. Some decision-
makers use the phrase of ―strategic resistance‖ to underline that some citizens also used the 
argument to force up the prices for their properties. Because of all these resistances a delay of 
the construction work and an increase of transaction costs were inevitable.  
 
(c) Generally trust among decision-makers as well as between decision-makers and the 
local population is important for the implementation of adaptation measures. The inter-
views revealed that the better actors know and trust each other the more likely it is that meas-
ures are quickly completed. Of particular importance are contacts to local decision-makers and 
the affected population, because their local knowledge is essential for the implementation of 
measures. However, more important is their acceptance and embedding within the community. 
Local decision-makers, it is argued, have the integrity and acceptance, which regional decision-
makers (e.g. LTV) do not have, at least in the view of the local population. People trust local de-
cision-makers more than regional, which are more distant to the specific issues and argument on 
the spot. Therefore, the inclusion of local decision-makers (e.g. mayors) and their support for the 
respective measure to be implemented is important for building a trustful relationship between 
the executing authorities and the responsible persons.  
This is also emphasized by the case of Grimma where a locally operated warning system 
was installed after the flood. The mayor proposed along with others to install an SMS warning 
system, which is not dependent on the official warning system of the Free State of Saxony. Many 
people assign the implementation of this measure to the personal interests, charisma and effort 
of the mayor of Grimma. The consideration and complementation of nonstructural measures is in 
our empirical example, above all, dependent on the personal effort of an individual – and not a 
formally institutionalized effort of flood protection.  
 
Summary: The empirical example shows the effect that particular forms of governance can have 
on the kinds of strategies that are employed to deal with hazards. Although on the legislative 
level an integrative adaptation approach is pursued, this strategy is not implemented on the or-
ganizational and project level. Here technical measures clearly dominate. The reasons are 
therefore, that, firstly, the organizational division of labor between the LTV (responsible for struc-
tural measures) and the LfUG (responsible for non-structural measures) favors structural meas-
ures, since the LTV is mainly responsible and disposes over higher funds. Secondly, the respon-
sible decision-makers of the LTV, although open minded to non-structural measures, are mostly 
grounded in an engineering culture favoring structural measures. Thirdly, among the local popu-
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lation a strong belief in the superiority of structural measures exists, which is taken up and im-
plemented by the decision-makers. This empirical example therefore supports the argument 
made in the earlier sections of this report where we show that it is essential to understand the 
broader governance processes at work within a particular region before we can understand the 
more specific issues concerned with the management of natural hazards.  
 
7.4  Empirical example 3: The Barcelona Drought 2007/8, Spain 
The drought experienced in the internal Catalan basins, from January 2007 until May 2008, has 
been claimed to be the worst experienced for 68 years. In order to understand the governance 
issues involved in this drought episode the wider physical, policy and political context needs to 
be introduced.  
The context of water supply and demand 
Droughts are one of the adverse meteorological events that have the greatest effect on Catalu-
nya. Notwithstanding, uncertainty is and has always been a characteristic of the availability of 
water resources in Catalunya, especially in the inland basins. With a general Mediterranean cli-
mate, its location and geography mean that Catalunya displays certain atypical features that 
result in a very diverse and irregular annual rainfall pattern, with high interannual variability and 
strong unevenly territorial rainfall distribution even in normal circumstances (Dptmt. de Medi Am-
bient. GenCat, 2009). The strong regional and seasonal differences in precipitation and soil 
moisture, characteristics of Catalunya, have important implications for water supply, notably the 
need for the transfer and storage of water within the different regions to match supply and de-
mand, since demand represents a very high proportion of average inflow (Dptmt. de Medi Am-
bient. GenCat, 2009). 
Depending on the irregularity of the weather, Catalunya suffers strong, highly-localised 
precipitation, and dry cycles. Drought cycles have been experienced recurrently for many years 
now. Hence, though not being the norm, droughts are not exceptional in Catalunya. Over the last 
20 years (1988-2008) there have been 6 drought alert periods in the internal basins, leading to 
the adoption of exceptional measures in order to guarantee supply (see graph 1) (Water in Cata-
lunya, ACA, 2008).  
Additionally to the suffered recurrent drought cycles, the case of Barcelona, Catalunya, 
presents the added problem of a structural deficit in the internal Ter-Llobregat basin region 
where urban demand, mainly driven from approximately 5.5 million people, 90% of the Catalan 
population, depend on 5 dams accounting for a total water storage capacity of about 600hm3; 
thus, being demand very close to the available level of resources. Moreover, it is where demand-
ing standards in terms of quality and guarantee of supply are the highest (Water in Catalunya, 
ACA, 2008). This structural deficit, the fact that domestic use is the highest demand on the inter-
nal hydrographic basins and its propensity to suffer drought periods adds further pressure 
among competition with other economic sectors. 
This complexity makes the critical problem of water shortages the environmental issue 
which has attracted and attracts more popular and political attention than any other one in Cata-
lunya, even in Spain (Kent et al., 2002). 
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Figure 6: Dammed volumes in Ter-Llobregat system with indication of drought decrees ordered by the Catalan Water 
Agency over the last 25 years (Source: Water in Catalunya, ACA, 2008). 
 
Droughts and management approaches  
To add to this complexity is the fact that droughts in Spain, and in Catalunya, had always been 
managed by emergency. Hence, drought management policies were usually using a crisis man-
agement approach by declaring a national and regional drought program to alleviate drought 
impacts (the Drought Decree of Catalunya), or by transporting water from different rivers or wa-
ter basins to another location, such as from the Ebro river (Karen, V. 2007). This is instead of 
creating sustainable short and long term drought mitigation and preparedness policies and plans 
of action that could reduce vulnerabilities to droughts.  
In 2001 the Hydrological National Plan established in article 27 the basis for the planned 
management of droughts and the development in each basin of a special drought action plan 
(Romero,R; 2008). Also the following years have seen further valuable information and man-
agement experience gained from the drought episodes of 1998-2002 and 2005. This in particular 
enabled the writing of regulations for the use of reservoirs and the development of numerical 
management models for the different use systems. It was during the drought of 2005 that the 
decree passed by the Catalan Government (Decree 93/2005, 17 May) added important im-
provements to previous approaches. These included: the strict definition of the entry thresholds 
into each of the three differently defined scenarios to each defined use system, the integrated 
management of groundwater, research projects to substitute the resource with regenerated wa-
ters, and the smooth running of the coordination and communication areas specifically estab-
lished for this episode (http://aca-web.gencat.cat). 
For Catalunya, the Catalan Water Agency (ACA) is the public authority with full compe-
tence over the entire water cycle for the internal watersheds of Catalunya (planning, administra-
tion, control, promotion, regulation and management). It is, therefore, the water authority or wa-
tershed body for this public water area. For watersheds shared among more than one communi-
ty, the Agency shares competence with the hydrographical confederations of the Ebro and Júcar 
regarding treatment and intervention in the public water domain (http://aca-web.gencat.cat). The 
Agency is regulated by the Legislative Decree 3/2003 which regulates the competences of the 
Government of Catalunya and of the local authorities in water issues and hydraulic works. It is 
also regulated by the statutes which describe its organisational structure and system of function-
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ing. Nowadays the governing policies and management concerning water in Catalunya are 
based on the principles of the Water Framework Directive (http://aca-web.gencat.cat). 
Changes in Water policy 
These developments in Catalunya have taken place in the context of wider dramatic changes in 
Spain‘s water policy both in principles and in practical terms in the last twenty years (Garrido and 
Llamas, 2007). Among the major water policy reforms are the water law reform in 1999, enabling 
water market transactions (one of the main changes was the regulation of the exchange of water 
rights, permitting right-holders to engage in voluntary water transfers and the Basin Authorities to 
set up water banks or trading centers in case of droughts or of severe scarcity problems), the EU 
Water Framework Directive in 2000 (that implies for Spain a rebalancing of priorities from ensur-
ing water supplies to all economic users to improving the ecological status of all water bodies), 
the 2001 National Hydrological Plan (NHP) and its subsequent reform in 2004, these two laws 
approved and repealed a major inter-basin water transfer project, the so-called Ebro water trans-
fer which epitomizes the breakdown of consensus of a century-old way of thinking, planning and 
executing water policies (Garrido and Llamas, 2007).  
Though the old mode of water policy civil engineering projects, based on big water works, 
were often the main means to meet water demands, as the region‘s demands outstripped basin 
storage capacities, so inter-basin water transfers were often favoured as a way to compensate 
for water deficits. Such was the drive for economic development that the environment was sel-
dom seen as an inhibiting political issue (Garrido and Llamas, 2007). Hence, in the mid-20th 
century dam construction increased ten-fold, such that today Spain has over 1,000 dams and 
reservoirs that cover more than 5% of the country‘s surface area (Downward and Taylor, 2007).  
However, from the Spanish National Hydrological Plan (NHP) 2001 with its major Ebro 
water transfer plan, emerged a conflict between the need of regions to meet their rising water 
demand and the ability of the natural environment to sustain levels of abstraction without poten-
tially lasting damage. The Plan detailed the transfer of 1050hm3/yr of water from the Ebro basin 
in Catalonia, some to as far as Almería (over 700km away), and was intended to balance na-
tional water ‗abundance‘ and deficits. However, as noticed, serious environmental concerns were 
highlighted, particularly with respect to compliance with European Union (EU) environmental 
directives, such as the EU habitats directive and the EU water framework directive, the latter of 
which requires Spain to maintain the good ecological status of the Ebro River. Opponents also 
noted that the Ebro transfer would further accentuate the already apparent economic disparities 
that exist between the conceding and recipient regions, claiming that agriculture in northern 
Spain would suffer to support the seemingly unsustainable thirst for development in the south 
(Downward and Taylor, 2007).  
Worthy of special note is also the fact that this approval and repeal of Ebro‘s water trans-
fer went along with a political party change in the government. But, while the 2001 NHP was 
stopped soon after the Socialist Administration came into office in 2004, conflicts subsided but 
did not disappear (Garrido and Llamas, 2007). Therefore, the implications of the approval and 
subsequent repeal of such a big project go beyond the discussion of alternative plans to solve 
water problems, as it tells about the inability to create bipartisan agreements on issues that tran-
scend the 4-year political periods.  
In 2004, Spain‘s newly elected socialist government launched a new water policy named 
the Programa AGUA, ‗actions for the management and the use of water‘ (Garrido and Llamas, 
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2007; Downward and Taylor, 2007). In his 2004 investiture speech, Spain‘s newly elected Prime 
Minister, José Luís Rodríguez Zapetero, stated, ‗‗I want to announce a new politics of water, a 
politics that will take into consideration the economic, social and environmental value of water 
with the objective of guaranteeing its availability and its quality, optimising its use and restoring 
the associated ecosystems‘‘ (Downward and Taylor, 2007). Therefore, the AGUA program was 
forthright in stating it‘s compliance with EU environmental legislation and made specific refer-
ence to the EU Water Framework Directive in its stated aim of promoting water savings through 
full-cost recovery by 2010. However, recognising that water savings alone would not be sufficient 
to meet changing demands for water in the Mediterranean regions, it emphasised desalination 
as the means to ‗better guarantee its availability and its quality‘; thus it was meant to replace the 
future supplies of the transfer by twenty large seawater desalination and waste water plants 
(Garrido and Llamas, 2007; Downward and Taylor, 2007). 
The 2007-8 drought and its management 
The last drought period experienced in the internal Catalan basins, from January 2007 until May 
2008, has been claimed to be the worst drought ever experienced since 68 years ago. The per-
sistent lack of rainfall, announced by ACA early January 2007 led to the Drought Decree being 
issued on 3 April, 2007. As stated before, having learnt from previous drought episodes the De-
cree was passed after a rapid processing of information and amendment in order to include as-
pects of interest to other ministries of the Catalan Government, water suppliers‘ associations, 
communities of irrigation farms affected, the Metropolitan Agency, and other members of the 
spillover committees, the bodies responsible for managing the regulated systems of the inland 
basins in Catalunya (http://aca-web.gencat.cat). 
The Decree came into force on 13 April, 2007, and stated in its text that it should remain 
in force until 31 December 2007. As by the following 31 December the decline in reserves had 
not stopped and it was therefore not possible for all of the basins to exceed the limits required to 
be removed from the category of exceptional status 2, on 27 November 2007 Decree 84/2007 
was passed, which was to remain in place until 31 December 2008 unless the reserves of water 
in all of the basins listed exceed the limits required to be removed from the category of excep-
tional status 2, at which point it would cease to be valid (http://aca-web.gencat.cat). 
The Decree organised the management of the drought by setting up an inter-institutional 
committee made up of members of the Department of Governance and Public Administration; 
the Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Action; the Department of Health; the Department 
of Innovation, Universities and Enterprise; the Department of Economy and Finance; the De-
partment of Home Affairs, Institutional Relations and Participation; the Catalan Water Agency; 
the Catalan Association of Municipalities and Regions; the Federation of Catalan Municipalities 
and the Metropolitan Agency for Hydraulic Services and Waste Treatment. The aim of this inter-
institutional committee was to make proposals to the Government in terms of actions and addi-
tional economic provisions aimed at defraying the costs resulting from the Decree corresponding 
to services or interventions provided by the different ministries of the Catalan Government. 
The Catalan Water Agency (ACA) implemented a series of instruments and management 
plans that included a variety of measures aimed at reducing water consumption, the recovery of 
aquifers and the application of the new Decree on Drought 2007, which laid down different sce-
narios and progressive, selective restrictions in all areas aimed at conserving water reserves in 
order to prevent a situation of emergency in which restrictions would be applied to domestic wa-
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ter use. Restrictions on non-priority uses and savings in the supply based on the obligations es-
tablished in the Decree represented a reduction in consumption from the supply network of 
around 6%, according to figures for 2005. The main instruments and management plans imple-
mented were: 
At the end of January 2007, the Permanent Drought Committee (CPS) was set up with-
in the ACA as the executive body for monitoring periods of scarce resources and for planning 
actions to be taken.  
The Drought Management Committee (CGS) was also set up and was set the double 
task of drawing up the new Decree on exceptional and emergency measures for the manage-
ment of probable future periods of drought, along with the writing and processing of the Drought 
Management Plan.  
A campaign to encourage water conservation was also launched. ACA opened a web 
site to inform about the daily progress of drinkable water availability, to explain about measures 
taken to reduce water demand and to provide advice to citizens in order to collaborate in reduc-
ing water consumption. Furthermore, the website also allowed people to follow the water levels 
of the Catalan reservoirs through graphs and real images, as well as rain forecast for the next 
days and graphs of the evolution of the rains in the last decades. Moreover, some pedagogical 
resources to raise awareness about sound water practices and uses were also available. 
In order to carry out its functions, the CGS created the working groups necessary for en-
suring that the results were operational and were attained with the agreement of the different 
users, among which the Working Group with Suppliers (ATLL, ASAC, AAA, EMSHTR) should 
be highlighted, so as to coordinate drought management measures with the emergency supply 
plans.  
In addition, the Extraordinary Spillover Committee of the Llobregat was set up in or-
der to implement certain instructions for spillovers and catchment points that were more in-line 
with the real situation of the regulated reserves of this basin, as an advance implementation of 
the measures that were later laid out in Decree 84/2007. The reduction of supply to the river Llo-
bregat had been more significant than the reduction of supply to the Ter and this measure aimed 
to safeguard those uses of water for which the supply came exclusively from reservoirs in the 
river Llobregat and the aquifer of Vall Baixa and the Llobregat Delta. 
The measures to conserve water were laid down in the Decree and were complementary 
to the actions that could be taken by all citizens in terms of household consumption. They in-
cluded municipal actions such as reducing the watering of gardens, closing ornamental foun-
tains, reducing the cleaning of streets with drinkable water, controlling the filling of private swim-
ming pools, the use of private springs, the production of municipal contingency plans for munici-
palities of more than 20,000 inhabitants and those covered by Aigües Ter-Llobregat (ATLL), the 
publication of edicts and the application of measures on a municipal level, etc (http://aca-
web.gencat.cat). 
The total investment made during the drought 2007-08 amounted to 507 M Euros that 





Table 3: Investments in different measures during the drought 
 
Measures and investments 
 CapHaz-Net WP 2 REPORT RISK GOVERNANCE (Version 3, April 2010) 50 
Figure 7: Level of reservoirs at the Ter-Llobregat 




38.5 M€ Water supply by tankers 
Water conservation campaigns 
Shipping transport of water 
Structural 
Measures 
63.5 M€ New treatment plants 




405 M € Expansion of Blanes desalination plant 
Connection with the Cardedeu‘s drinking water plant 
Contribution of regenerated water flows to the river Llobregat 
Division of the salmorras sewer  
 
By the beginning of spring 2008 shortages were 
predicted to occur due to the low storage level 
of water reserves (August and Geiger, WWF, 
2008). In late April 2008/early May 2008, dams 
in the Ter-Llobregat system were at only 22% of 
their storage capacity (see Figure 7) and the 
‗emergency‘ scenario threshold was almost 
reached. However spring rains significantly im-
proved the situation for most of the country rul-
ing out any possible urban water shortages in 
the following autumn in Catalunya. Had the 
rains not arrived, urban water shortages could 
have occurred given the low storage level of 
water reserves available at the end of April 2008 
(which decreased up to nearly 20% the Ter-
Llobregat system by March 2008 (see Figure 7). 
 
It must also be highlighted though, that all the 
effort during the drought 2007-2008 by either 
the Catalan Government, through their different 
applied water conservation awareness cam-
paigns and the citizens contributed to reduce 
the risk of water limitations in urban supply. 
Janot Guil stated this fact in his press article in 
the ABC.es newspaper on 12 March, 2008, with 
the following headlines: ―Each Catalan citizen 
saved more than 4.000 litres of water in 2007 
due to the ‗Drought effect‘‖, noticing that the 
Catalan population had been aware of the prob-
lem and had translated its attitude into facts 
(ABC.es Catalunya, 12/03/2008). Actually, ac-
cording to consumption turnover data from supplying companies, Catalan citizens consumed an 
average of four per cent less water in 2007 compared to 2006. However, in the Metropolitan Re-
gion of Barcelona (MRB) this percentage was six percent less rather than four, a figure which 
meant a global saving of 30 cubic hectometers, the equivalent to what the MRB consumes in a 
month. 
Within Barcelona specifically the consumption trends are striking. The control in household con-
sumption in the Metropolitan Region of Barcelona (MRB) was set to 110 l/inhab/day in 2007, 
Figure 8: Household consumption evolution in 
Catalunya from 1993 to 2006 (Source: Water in 
Catalunya, ACA, 2008). 
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whereas recorded water household consumption data in 2000 stood at around 210.8 l/inhab/day 
(see Figure 9). The Spanish water household consumption mean is 148 l/inhab/day (141 
l/inhab/day in metropolitan areas). By comparison figures for other European countries include, 
126 l/inhab/day in the Netherlands, 144 l/inhab/day in Ireland, 150 l/inhab/day in France, and 
250 l/inhab/ day in Italy. 
However, despite having dealt with this drought 
episode with more anticipation and prepared-
ness than any other previously experienced, 
there were limitations. As Joan Subirats re-
marked in his article from El País (29/05/2008): 
„The decisions that were taken previously were 
pointing at a very positive redefinition and re-
consideration of the water management in Cata-
lunya, though not allowing them to face the ex-
ceptionality of the moment‟. 
Indeed, it was in late April 2008/early May 
2008, in view of the seriousness of the situation 
concerning the water reserves at the Ter-
Llobregat system (see Figure 7), that the Cata-
lan Government announced household water 
restrictions would have to be applied in the com-
ing October. Particularly if the drought cycle was 
going to continue and water resources from the 
neighbouring Ebro‘s basin were not transferred 
(Del Moral, 2008). 
Thus, the immediate problem was: What 
to do from October‘08 until April‘09? Which was when the starting of the desalination plant in the 
Llobregat was foreseen (El País, 31/03/2008), since a responsible government, could not take 
policy decisions based on the possibility of rain (El País, 31/03/2008). 
Given the emergency of the situation, suggestions from the Government were to reactivate 
transferring water projects (Garrido and Llamas, 2007). This produced again the controversy on 
the Ebro‘s or the Rhône river transfer, but this time the government added a new proposal: ob-
taining water from the river Segre (a tributary of the Ebro). 
It was this last proposal of transferring water from river Segre to Llobregat that raised the 
major criticisms to the Government‘s management of the situation. The newspaper El País 
quoted in 31/03/2008: ‗the transfer of 20-45 hectometers of water from the Segre to the Llobre-
gat rivers, is not the worst solution. But it has been clouded by the erratic policy of the counselor 
of Environment, Francesc Baltasar, since it is a transfer proposed by a Government that had 
advocated the rejection of any transfer‟ (El País, 31/03/2008); likewise, Joan Subirats (El País, 
29/05/2008) stated that: ‗the Government parties, in their management of the problem, contradict 
many of the good practices that they helped to start´ (El País, 29/05/2008); also a joint press 
release from different ecologist organisations (04/04/2008), Friends of the Earth, Ecologistas en 
Acción, Greenpeace, SEO/BirdLife and WWF/Adena, demanded rationality, sustainability and 
coherence in the water policy; finally Leandro del Moral asserted (18/06/2008) that: ‗[...] the rainy 
spring [...] offers to the Catalan Government the opportunity to prove the truthfulness of its com-
Figure 9: Evolution of reservoir levels at the Ter-
Llobregat basin system with indication of the three 
different scenarios considered in the Decree of 
Drought. (Source: La política de l‘aigua: fets desta-
cables del 2008 a Catalunya. ACA, 2008). 
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mitment to the new culture of water, as well as its willingness to manage drought, from now on, 
in a transparent and participative way.‘ 
In addition to the criticism of political incoherence was the lack of transparency, dialogue 
and clarity. Criticisms that were supported by the ICV youth associations with their statement of 
the lack of ―transparency, negotiation and clarity‖ from the counselor when he proposed the Se-
gre river transfer (El País, La Vanguardia, 07/04/2008); similar criticisms were also expressed by 
the The Ecologist Left-Green association (EcoDiario, El Economista, 28/03/2008). Likewise the 
Mayor of Lleida, the socialist Àngel Ros, declared that the transfer of river Segre, in Lleida, was: 
„I think it has been raised with a lack of dialogue and transparency, and with not much opinion 
from the territory‟ and he added „and it is just the lack of information what entails, on many occa-
sions, to speculation and distrust‟ (Europa press, 27/03/2008). Finally Joan Subirats (El País, 
29/05/2008) stated that: ‗we should consider it to be loathsome the communication that was pro-
vided about the decisions revealed and concealed that were being taken. The management of 
the counselor Francesc Baltasar has been “zig-zaging”, rarely clear and almost always badly 
explained‘ and he added ‗Coordination and co-responsibility was absent, not only between the 
Catalan and the Central Government, neither between the different departments of the Catalan 
Government, nor even the Department of Environment and the Catalan Agency of the Water‟. 
To prevent from repeating similar situations in the future, at present, work has already be-
gun on developing the Drought Management Plan (EFE. Hispagua, 17/12/2008). 
 
Summary: The Barcelona drought provides a good example of changing governance practices 
in relation to water management, from an approach which has historically been dominated by a 
reactionary approach to drought and the use of large-scale structural measures (such as water 
transfer projects and desalination plants) towards a more preventative approach based upon 
anticipation and water conservation. Interestingly, we can also see how there are interactions 
between the different levels of government, with EU policy (such as the Water Framework Direc-
tive) being a factor in the reorientation towards more environmentally-sensitive forms of drought 
management. However, problems occurred when the severity of the situation led to the govern-
ment reconsidering the ‗old‘ approaches of more structural measures, leading to allegations of 
inconsistency and ‗erratic‘ policy-making. 
 
7.5  Some Comparative Observations from the Empirical Examples 
These three empirical examples highlight many of the points made earlier about the governance 
and risk governance of natural hazards; as well as introducing some further questions.  
First, the complexity of risk governance is clearly evident, in terms of the number and 
diversity of public and private organisations and interests directly involved in each case and the 
involved and shifting relationships between different levels; from local, regional and national 
through to European. Also the impacts of shifts in state-market-society relations since the 1980s 
are highlighted, for example in the case of the Hull flood, where privatization and regulation of 
the water industry were implicated, and in the changes in Catalunya water policy over the last 
few decades. Clearly here the governance of natural hazards cannot be neatly demarcated from 
(water) governance more generally, or from wider political and ideological shifts.  
Second whilst in each case we can see multiple actors operating through a variety of 
networks and partnership arrangements, the overall governance regimes in place were not 
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necessarily well-defined. For example, in Hull most of the actors involved were no more than 
‗loosely coupled‘ and there was a lack of collective understanding regarding the exercise of au-
thority and the allocation of roles and responsibilities. While the various actors were clearly re-
liant upon each other for the delivery of various risk management functions, a purposive system 
of governance to connect and coordinate those actors and functions had not been created. 
There is therefore a substantial gap between the ideals of multi-stakeholder, multi-level gover-
nance and its effectiveness in reality.  
Third, whereas the research literature tends to characterise risk governance as a ‘neat’ 
process involving distinct phases of inter-related activity, the empirical examples present a 
somewhat different picture. In Hull efforts to understand, prevent, mitigate, and recover from the 
flood were disjointed and often ineffective. In Germany and Catalunya the adoption of different 
potential risk management measures became politicised and controversial. Decisions were chal-
lenged, or reopened after previous apparent resolutions. The circular, iterative and messy cha-
racter of risk governance is clear, with particular events or episodes having important catalytic 
effects. The various temporal dimensions of governance are therefore interesting to think 
about.   
Fourth, and related, we can see in each case how there are multiple measures consi-
dered for enacting various forms of risk mitigation or reduction – extending from big-scale engi-
neering (flood defence, drainage systems, water transfers) to actions by individuals and house-
holds. Whilst this represents a significant shift from the past where typically only structural 
measures were implemented, there are significant debates about the relative effectiveness, effi-
ciency and acceptability of different measures, how they should be enacted and the ‗mix‘ that 
should be pursued in any one case. In particular there are tensions around moving responsibili-
ties towards individuals – in Barcelona this was productive in cutting water consumption, in 
Germany it is required by law but not welcomed or preferred by citizens, in Hull building house-
hold resilience into recovery processes has proved problematic.  
Fifth, we can begin to trace the role of knowledge and its communication between ac-
tors in each case. In Catalunya efforts were made to provide for the improved collection and cir-
culation of technical knowledge about the evolution of the drought, multi-agency committees 
were established and communication campaigns with the public appear to have had significant 
impacts in reducing water consumption. In Hull knowledge was in contrast far more problematic, 
with no ability to forecast the extent or locations of flooding, no specific flood warning being is-
sued, poor coordination and communication between various agencies and problems with 
access to information for the post-flood inquiry. In Germany the importance of trust between ac-
tors was highlighted particularly at a local level, in shaping how knowledge is used and commu-
nications are responded to.  
Sixth we can ask in each case about the role of ‘learning’ in risk governance. There ap-
pears to be some evidence of productive learning in operation, for example in the learning from 
previous droughts in Spain and the recommendations emerging from various inquiry processes 
after the 2007 floods in the UK. However the processes of actual legislative, institutional or poli-
cy reform that relate to such learning can be slow and bureaucratic. Developing a risk gover-
nance approach that has a more proactive orientation and the development of processes which 
encourage self-learning and adaptation could therefore be an important goal. The Hull flood also 
showed how the householders that were flooded, as well as those involved in the relief efforts, 
gained a great deal of knowledge from their experiences but that such learning would typically 
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be overlooked or devalued in traditional governance frameworks which emphasize ‗expert-to-
public‘ communication.  
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8 Challenges for Future Risk Governance in Europe 
This section of the ‗living document‘ is to be developed over the rest of the project. For the mo-
ment it briefly highlights some issues for future discussion. 
Climate Change and Risks 
Various forms of natural hazard are expected to shift in their frequency of occurrence, severity 
and/or locational patterns as climate change takes hold. This has implications not only for the 
occurrence of natural hazards, but also for the certainty with which such risks can be assessed, 
and therefore for the knowledge about risks that can be claimed, utilized and communicated. 
Climate change is becoming part of the handling of natural hazards, but only patchily and the 
relationship between the governance of adaptation to climate change and the governance of risk 
is still taking shape.  
Social and Economic Change and Vulnerabilities 
The FP6 SCENARIO project considered how potential future processes of change in Europe 
could be significant to the shaping of future vulnerabilities to hazards in Europe – and therefore 
potentially important for future risk governance. The project showed how each of the following 
could be significant: 
 
• as the European population ages there will be more people living with greater vulnerability to 
the impacts of natural hazard events. The availability of resources to look after and protect this 
ageing population will be increasingly stretched, particularly in the poorer parts of the EU 
• as migration continues, and potentially increases in its scale around Europe, the places where 
people live will evolve – potentially for the better or worse in relation to natural hazard exposure 
– and increased cultural mixing will pose greater challenges for those involved in risk commu-
nication and developing community preparedness. Climate change may provide a further driver 
for population movement and migration.  
• as some parts of Europe and some parts of the European population become more wealthy, 
others are likely to remain poor and in poverty. This ‗underclass‘ will continue to be particularly 
vulnerable to the impacts of natural hazards, especially where they are concentrated in risky 
areas and where the resources to afford insurance and protection measures are not available. 
An increasingly economically and socially polarized Europe may find it harder to provide any-
thing like universal standards of protection and resilience. 
• as Europe comes out of recession it is likely that the concentration of people, wealth, property 
and economic activity will continue to be focused on the major metropolitan urban areas, some 
of which are already prone to various forms of natural hazard. Marginalised and depopulated 
rural areas in parts of Europe may find it harder as a result to gather the resources to cope with 
natural hazards.  
• as interconnections, infrastructures and networks, such as for those energy, transport and in-
formation, become, in various ways, more important to everyday life and economic activity and 
extended dependencies develop, the systemic impact of disruption and damage may become 
all the more significant. The systemic independencies this implies has been a strong theme of 
the IRGC. 
 
 CapHaz-Net WP 2 REPORT RISK GOVERNANCE (Version 3, April 2010) 56 
Institutional and Political Change 
The credit crunch and global economic recession has raised questions about whether or not we 
will see a turn away from neo-liberal approaches and towards governments becoming more in-
terventionist and less sanguine about reliance on market processes to achieve societal objec-
tives. This could be interpreted as a move back towards more traditional ways of governing, or at 
least to some degree a re-balancing of relations between state, market and civil society. On the 
other hand for governments in major debt as a consequence of supporting financial institutions, 
a period of severely restrained public spending and streamlining of public services is widely pre-
dicted which could push even more strongly towards a ‗rolling-back‘ of the state.  
  
What implications could each of these changes have for risk governance in a European context? 
 
What could they each also mean for social capacity building and for risk communication, percep-
tion and education?  
 
Are there other important current and future potential changes that a future orientation to risk 
governance should be taking account of?  
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10 Annex 1: Multi-level governance in Europe 
Table 4: Multi-level governance in managing the risk arising from natural hazards: Some examples from Europe (to be continued) 
Country/Region Multi-level Governance: How is responsibility for the man-
agement of hazards distributed between governmental ac-
tors at different levels (local, regional, national)?  
Individualization of Risk: 
To what extent are those 
at risk from hazards being 
expected to reduce their 
vulnerability to harm?  
Risk Transfer (insurance) 
(based on Schwarze and 
Wagner 2009) 
Privatization and Marketiza-
tion: are water utilities in public 
or private ownership? Have 
other relevant government 
functions been passed to pri-
vate sector or to the market? 
England/Wales 
(floods) 
National Level: Environment Agency has national overview 
of all flood risks; coordination and responsibility for river and 
coastal risks (assessment, structural measures, and non-
structural warning, awareness).  
Local Level: Proposed [legislation is progressing] that Local 
Authorities (LA) should have a new role as lead local flood-
risk authority, responsible for bringing together all relevant 
bodies (e.g. Environment Agency, water companies, district 
councils) to help manage local flood risk; including surface-
water flood risks (previously excluded from legislation). 
Local Planning Authorities are responsible for floodplain 
development which must also comply with national policy 
(PPG25). Local responsibility for disaster response is stra-
tegically managed within a tiered national ‗resilience‘ frame-




ing (but not requiring) 
householders and busi-
nesses to be prepared 
and to increase their resil-
ience. Includes some 
provision of funding sup-
port for households.  
 
 
Pure private insurance 
with individual premium 
calculation, i.e. high sup-
plementary premiums for 
high risk exposures. High 
market penetration (75 % of 
private building) but differ-
entiation across the scale of 
deprivation (i.e. the more 
deprived are more likely to 
be uninsured/underinsured) 
Water utilities privatized in 
early 1990s; OFWAT regulates 
the water industry, controls 
prices and performance; Much 
social housing sold to owners 
in 80s/90s.  
France 
(floods) 
National Level: Management of flood risks depends on four 
different ministries (Ministry of Ecology, Ministry of the Inte-
rior, Ministry of the Economy and Ministry of Agriculture). 
Additionally, in June 2009 a new organisation was created 
(COPRIM) for the prevention of natural hazards;  
Regional level: Councils and authorities have no direct 
responsibility, but can influence flood risk management 
indirectly (funding etc.).  
Department level: Prefect is responsible for assistance 
when a crisis exceeds the capacity of the municipalities.  
Local Level: Flood risk needs to be taken into account in 
urban planning documents, risks need to be communicated 
to citizens; protection measures etc. need to be maintained 
in good condition, responsibility for emergencies.  
 
Not expected: Citizens 
are not encouraged to 
reduce their vulnerability.  
 
Private insurers are 
obliged to provide compre-
hensive insurance protec-
tion against natural haz-
ards; differentiation in mar-
ket ―insurable‖ risks and 
market ―uninsurable‖ risks. 
To cover the latter all prop-
erty insurance contracts pay 
a 12.5% premium above 
their household insurance; 
High insurance density al-
most up to 100 % 
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Germany/Saxony 
(floods) 
National level: Federal Government and national laws 
provide general policy framework and laws for risk man-
agement and disaster protection. They are further specified 
on the level of states.  
State level: Main responsibility the level of the states: In the 
state of Saxony, State Reservoir Administration (LTV) is 
above all responsible for planning and implementation of 
structural flood protection measures; Saxon State Agency 
for Environment and Geology (LfUG) is responsible for non-
structural measures (e.g. warning). 
Regional level: Regional planning authorities provide gen-
eral framework for land-use. 
Local level: Local authorities are responsible for urban 
land-use planning. 
Responsibility for disaster protection depends on the 
magnitude of the event (local, regional and national).  
 
According to the Federal 
Water Law (WHG § 31 a) 
and the Saxon Water Law 
(WG § 99) citizens in 
areas prone to flood ha-
zards are obliged to im-
plement mitigation meas-
ures in accordance with 
their possibilities and 
abilities. 
Pure private insurance;  
Risk-based individual Pre-
mium calculation in the case 
of flood damage. Insurance 





National level: Environment Ministry determines trends and 
policies, allocates financial resources and coordinates the 
action of the Basin authorities (Law 183/89 identified 18 
interregional river basin authorities). Department of Civil 
Protection coordinates the Government‘s actions relative to 
forecasting, early warning, support and rescue. 
Interregional level: Basin Authorities (interregional level) 
are in charge of assessment of flood risks and basin plans. 
Basin plans define flood prevention, mitigation and commu-
nication policies.  
Regional and local level (Italy is divided into 20 administra-
tive regions, 103 provinces and 8102 municipalities): Re-
gions, Provinces and Municipalities: i) are responsible for 
the implementation of the measures foreseen by basin 
plans; ii) prepare programmes for risk forecasting and pre-
vention. The Prefect coordinates contingency plan and 
emergency response. Local fire brigades and civil protection 
services implement these plans. 
 
Encouraging: Law 
225/1992 (Civil protection 
law). Art. 6. Ordinary citi-
zens share responsibility 
for civil protection activi-
ties (as preparation and 
response) with a number 
of public actors at na-
tional, regional and local 
level.  
There is no private insur-
ance protection against 
damages caused by natural 
hazards.  
Decree 135/09 privatizes water 




National level: The state is responsible for risk manage-
ment according to the water law. Its power is given through 
the Ministry of Environment, who gives concessions to water 
companies. They should (and they are the only one who is 
allowed to) take care of the water courses by cleaning the 
bushes, building the dykes or dams, reinforcing the river 
banks etc.  
Disaster protection: Distribution between the actors de-
pending on the scale of event: a) municipality level, b) na-
Not expected: Citizens 
are not encouraged to 
reduce their vulnerability.  
 
 
People may insure their 
property (about 40 % of 
property is insured in Slove-
nia). Insurance for floods 
and earthquakes is possible 
and encouraged, but the 
decision is left to the own-
ers.  
Quite large discounts may 
The majority are in public own-
ership. In small settlements 
they are owned and run by 
local communities, while in 
towns they are run by public 
companies that have mostly 
been established by municipali-
ties. In a few cases due to 
privatization, municipalities no 
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tional level. Local event – management is in the hands of 
local authorities (municipality, major) and the local unit of the 
civil protection agency; Regional/national events – the na-
tional civil protection agency takes over its part, while the 









be available for ―packet/all 
inclusive insurances‖ (prop-
erty+ flood+earthquake. It 
may be even lower if car and 
health are also included). 
longer have an influence on 
them. The majority of these 
companies work on water utili-
ties (pipelines, waste water) 
and also on garbage deposi-
tion. The only private water 
utilities have been individual 
ones that can still be found in 
small settlements with scat-
tered housing in hilly and 
mountainous regions (a small 










Regional level Decentralization of water planning and man-
agement by Basin Agencies called Confederaciones Hidro-
gráficas (CI). For rivers that flow through more than one 
autonomous community, Intercommunity watershed, the 
corresponding CI is assigned to administrative effects to the 
Ministry of Environment, responsibility for local emergency 
planning with regional/local emergency services, and disas-
ter response. 
 
Local level: Intra-community watershed, the case when the 
river runs entirely within the territory of an autonomous 
community, the water administration of the respective 
autonomous community is then responsible for local emer-
gency planning with local emergency services and disaster 
response (as in the case of Catalunya). 
 
Encouraging. Awareness 
campaigns provide advice 
to citizens encouraging 
them to collaborate in 
reducing water consump-
tion. The campaigns pro-
vide information about the 




pulsory insurance against 
damage caused by geo-
atmospheric hazards and 
other extraordinary events 
(e.g. terrorist attacks). Insur-
ance density is high up to 
around 80 % 
In 2002, about 42% of the 
population in Spain was sup-
plied by public water compa-
nies; 40% by private water 
companies which operate un-
der concession contracts with 
the municipalities, 11% by 
mixed public-private compa-
nies; 6% by owned local corpo-
rations and the 1% left, by 





National level: The legal framework for dealing with natural 
hazards are the Federal Forest Law 1991 (SR921.0 
Bundesgesetz über den Wald, Waldgesetz, WaG und 
Verordnung, WaV), the Federal Water Engineering Law 
1991 (SR721.100, Bundesgesetz über den Wasserbau, 
WBG und Verordnung, WBV), and the Federal Law for Lan-
duse 1979 (SR700 Bundesgesetz über die Raumplanung, 
RPG und Verordnung, RPV). In addition, the federal offices 
publish recommendations to support cantons and communi-
ties in their duties. 
Regional level: Additionally, there are cantonal forest laws 
and water engineering laws. In some cantons, river semi-
public corporations are responsible for the maintenance of 
the protection infrastructure (e.g. Schwellengemeinden). 
Cantons are responsible for hazard mapping 
Encouraging: Building 
insurers are encouraging 
private house owners to 
take mitigation measures. 
There are guidelines for 
architects, civil engineers 
and house owners on how 
to protect buildings 
against gravitational and 
meteorological hazards 
Public-private insurance: 
All home owners must in-
sure against natural haz-
ards; two different systems: 
In 19 of 26 Swiss cantons 
there is a public cantonal 
property insurance (KGV); in 
the other 7 so called GUS-
TAVO cantons this protec-
tion is offered by private 
insurers. Private insurance 
premiums are around double 
as high as public insurance. 
Insurance density around 
100 % 
Water utility largely in public 
ownership with some excep-
tions of private companies (eg. 
Wasserwerke Zug). During 
recent 5 years or so some 
public providers have trans-
formed into cooperations with 
public and private sharehold-
ers, this is especially the case 
for multi-utility providers 
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This table was completed with contributions from Jacques Comby, Thierry Coanus (France), Christian Kuhlicke (Germany), Anna Scolobig, Luigi Pellinzoni (Italy), 
Blaž Komac, Primož Pipan (Slovenia), Matthias Buchecker, Corina Höppner, Michael Bründl (Switzerland), Marta Dinarès Fernandez, Meera Supramaniam (Spain).  
 
Local level: In principal, communities are responsible for 
the safety of their citizens; they are supported by the can-
tons, who are responsible for protecting humans and high 
assets. Communities are responsible for putting the results 
of hazard mapping into practice. 
 
